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FORMALIZING CHAPTER 9’S EXPERTS
Laura N. Coordes*
Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code has many shortcomings. One of the
most persistent, yet understudied, problems judges face in chapter 9 is also a
problem that exists in other areas of bankruptcy law: the sheer difficulty of
applying generalized plan confirmation standards to wildly different, highly
specialized entities. In practice, judges have turned to experts—individuals
well versed in municipal finance, mediation, and the particular debtor com-
munity—to help overcome this problem in chapter 9. These experts often per-
form critical roles in a municipal bankruptcy case, including conducting
mediations, investigating the municipality’s finances, and even helping to craft
the municipality’s plan of debt adjustment.
Despite the important roles experts play in bankruptcy, their appointment and
selection process receives little attention, and the scope of their role is often ill
defined. This Article highlights the concerns that arise due to the lack of proce-
dures surrounding experts in municipal bankruptcy. After exploring the bene-
fits and pitfalls associated with using experts in chapter 9 and elsewhere, this
Article provides detailed guidance for designing formal procedures for select-
ing, appointing, and using experts in chapter 9.
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Introduction
“I urge you now not to forget your anger. Your enduring and collective
memory of what happened here, and your memory of your anger about it,
will be exactly what will prevent this from ever happening again.”1 When
Judge Steven Rhodes spoke these words during Detroit’s chapter 9 plan con-
firmation proceedings, he acknowledged a fear felt by nearly everyone in the
courtroom: the fear that Detroit would not succeed postbankruptcy and
would fall back into severe financial distress. This fear persisted years after
Detroit exited bankruptcy.2
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code is supposed to assuage this fear. In
particular, the standards for confirming a chapter 9 plan of debt adjustment
are safeguards designed to ensure that a municipality exits bankruptcy on
firmer footing while acting in good faith toward its creditors. Yet, judges
tasked with confirming a municipality’s plan of adjustment struggle to apply
these standards, which were largely imported from chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code and do not easily map onto the particularities of municipal
fiscal distress.3 This struggle produces uncertainty about bankruptcy’s effec-
tiveness for municipalities, which in turn contributes to state and local offi-
cials’ reluctance to use (or permit) chapter 9 in the first place. Officials,
uncertain whether the process will work and wary of the risk that using it
will cut municipalities off from the capital markets, are likely to avoid chap-
ter 9.4
1. Nathan Bomey, Rhodes on Pensioners, DIA, Kevyn Orr and More, Det. Free Press
(Nov. 7, 2014, 8:08 PM) (quoting Transcript of Bench Decision at 66, In re City of Detroit, 524
B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 8257), http://www.freep.com/
story/news/local/detroit-bankruptcy/2014/11/07/rhodes-excerpts-ruling/18677011/ [https://
perma.cc/P27S-SUJT].
2. See, e.g., Quinn Klinefelter, Post-Bankruptcy, a Booming Detroit Is Still Fragile, NPR
(Dec. 12, 2015, 5:06 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/12/12/459192004/post-bankruptcy-a-
booming-detroit-is-still-fragile (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (describing Detroit as
“walking a financial tightrope”); Brian J. O’Connor, Detroit Facing Challenges One Year After
Bankruptcy, Det. News (Dec. 9, 2015, 6:18 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/lo
cal/detroitcity/2015/12/09/detroit-city-finances-one-year-bankruptcy/77063402/ [https://per
ma.cc/J462-8WRJ] (quoting director of municipal finance research firm who described De-
troit’s bankruptcy plan as “fragile”).
3. See Michael J. Deitch, Note, Time for an Update: A New Framework for Evaluating
Chapter 9 Bankruptcies, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 2705, 2726–27 (2015) (evaluating the inconsis-
tencies in chapter 9 plan confirmation orders); see also Bill Rochelle & Sherri Toub, Detroit
Judge Steven Rhodes Used Conscience to Approve Plan, 26 Bankr. L. Rep. (BNA) 1600 (2014)
(describing how Judge Rhodes dealt with difficult questions during plan confirmation “by
looking to his conscience and sense of morality”).
4. Laura Napoli Coordes, Restructuring Municipal Bankruptcy, 2016 Utah L. Rev. 307,
329–30 [hereinafter Coordes, Restructuring] (“Municipalities may be further discouraged from
adjusting debts out of concern that impairing debt may limit their access to capital markets
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Plan confirmation can be challenging in chapter 9 because municipali-
ties are not autonomous or self-governing. Instead, their actions are shaped
by the state in which they are located.5 Municipal officials must balance pay-
ments to creditors and the fulfillment of campaign promises with the imme-
diate needs of the people that live and work within municipal boundaries.6
The complex nature of municipalities, and notably their intertwined rela-
tionship with their state, make it difficult for judges and creditors to under-
stand a municipality’s ability to navigate the bankruptcy system.7 For their
part, states, particularly those facing fiscal problems of their own, are often
not in a position to actively manage municipal affairs.8 Further complicating
matters, the dearth of chapter 9 precedent makes it nearly impossible to
apply the plan confirmation standards in a consistent, straightforward man-
ner—and yet, that is exactly what chapter 9 judges are asked to do.9
and future funding.”); see also Laura N. Coordes, Gatekeepers Gone Wrong: Reforming the
Chapter 9 Eligibility Rules, 94 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1191, 1228–29 (2017) [hereinafter Coordes,
Gatekeepers] (discussing the rhetoric surrounding municipal bankruptcy as a further source of
discouragement of its use).
5. For an in-depth discussion of the myriad ways in which cities and the state in which
they are located are intertwined, see Gerald E. Frug & David J. Barron, City Bound: How
States Stifle Urban Innovation (2008). Local governments are also shaped by the federal
government. See, e.g., Lara Merling et al., Ctr. for Econ. & Policy Research, Life Af-
ter Debt in Puerto Rico: How Many More Lost Decades? (2017), http://cepr.net/images/
stories/reports/puerto-rico-2017-07.pdf [https://perma.cc/DKQ7-5H3N] (discussing how Pu-
erto Rico’s economic condition was partially a result of decisions made by the federal
government).
6. See Rebecca Gosch, Note, An “Immeasurable Sign of Great Hope”: The Detroit Institute
of the Arts, Municipal Bankruptcy and “Cultural Assets”, 51 Wash U. J.L. & Pol’y 233, 233–34
(2016) (“Due to the important roles citizens play [in municipal bankruptcy], already complex
legal issues can be further complicated by the very human concerns of a municipal popula-
tion.”); Frank Shafroth, Human Needs & Fiscal Imbalances, GMU Mun. Sustainability Pro-
ject (May 24, 2017), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2017/05/24/human-needs-fiscal-
imbalances/ [https://perma.cc/99XB-GMM6] (discussing this balancing act in Detroit and
Flint, Michigan).
7. See, e.g., Frug & Barron, supra note 5; see also Laura N. Coordes & Thom Reilly,
Predictors of Municipal Bankruptcies and State Intervention Programs: An Exploratory Study, 105
Ky. L.J. 493, 497 (2017) (“[A] vast array of different state laws impact a municipality’s fiscal
health.”); Juliet M. Moringiello, Chapter 9 Plan Confirmation Standards and the Role of State
Choices, 37 Campbell L. Rev. 71, 74 (2015) (noting the “scant body of case law applying the
[c]hapter 9 confirmation standards”); Samir D. Parikh & Zhaochen He, Failing Cities and the
Red Queen Phenomenon, 58 B.C. L. Rev. 599, 614 (2017) (“[A] municipality’s borrowing costs
are affected by its state and federal debt-restructuring options.”).
8. See, e.g., Coordes, Restructuring, supra note 4, at 353–55 (discussing problems with
state intervention); Stacie Sherman, N.J. Budget ‘Imbalanced’ on Partial Pension Payments, S&P
Says, Bloomberg (Mar. 16, 2017, 10:45 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2017-03-16/n-j-budget-imbalanced-on-partial-pension-payments-s-p-says [https://perma.cc/
E9QA-RCNL] (discussing severe problems with New Jersey’s budget and pension funding).
9. Deitch, supra note 3, at 2726–45 (evaluating the inconsistencies in judicial opinions
with respect to chapter 9 plan confirmations); Moringiello, supra note 7, at 74–75 (noting the
lack of judicial review surrounding confirmation standards due to the relatively small number
of cases).
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Uncertainty about chapter 9’s efficacy, combined with the cost and re-
source drain of bankruptcy, discourages municipalities from using chapter
9.10 With chapter 9 seemingly off the table, officials may instead choose to
delay addressing financial problems.11 As a consequence, although the num-
ber of municipal bankruptcies has decreased in recent years, the need to
resolve municipal fiscal distress is greater than ever. A well-publicized pen-
sion crisis is looming,12 and in many municipalities, this crisis is exacerbated
by other unsustainable obligations.13 Many smaller cities and towns are
struggling in quiet desperation,14 while large cities—even seemingly wealthy
ones—are grappling with more public crises.15 Budgetary problems also
10. See Moringiello, supra note 7, at 75 (noting that the lack of clarity with respect to
confirmation standards is “undesirable from a public policy standpoint” when states are trying
to decide whether or not to permit municipalities to file for bankruptcy).
11. Parikh & He, supra note 7, at 605 (describing “the reluctance of state officials and
policymakers to address” municipal distress).
12. Richard Ciccarone & Jeffrey L. Garceau, City Pension Plans Take a Surprise Upturn in
2015—Is Improvement a One-Off?, MuniNet Guide (Apr. 13, 2017), http://muninetguide.
com/city-pension-plans-upturn-2015/ [https://perma.cc/J6V2-M7ES] (noting that although
“[c]ity pension plans improved their funding ratios in 2015,” returns are expected to be lower
for 2016 and that the overall trend is a decline in funding ratios); Danica Coto, Puerto Rico
Seeks Court’s Help to Save Public Pension System, APNews.com (May 22, 2017), https://
apnews.com/c7ae9e5694a44262898af1009935bfc6/Puerto-Rico-seeks-court’s-help-to-save-pub
lic-pension-system [https://perma.cc/B6XG-HJSC] (describing how Puerto Rico sought to
have court-supervised pension restructuring in light of its debt crisis).
13. See, e.g., Coordes & Reilly, supra note 7, at 510 (illustrating how pension problems
combine with other factors to contribute to fiscal distress); Scott Pryor, The Night of the Living
Dead Is Coming: America’s Pension CrisES, Pryor Thoughts (Feb. 22, 2017), http://pryor
thoughts.blogspot.com/2017/02/the-night-of-living-dead-is-coming.html [https://perma.cc/
JNP4-LUQ8] (“The combination of subterranean promises to politically favored groups, un-
realistic assumptions about rates of return on investments, and the declining middle-class
birthrate makes the question of a fiscal cliff not one of if but of when.”).
14. See, e.g., Valerie Bauerlein, One Tiny North Carolina Town Votes to Disband, Wall
Street J. (Mar. 5, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/one-tiny-north-carolina-
town-votes-to-disband-1488718801 (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (statement of
David Rusk) (“Wealth has left these little cities to such a degree that they’re basically bank-
rupt.”) quoted in Frank Shafroth, Breaking up Is Hard to Do., GMU Mun. Sustainability
Project (Mar. 6, 2017), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2017/03/06/breaking-up-is-
hard-to-do/ [https://perma.cc/MLJ3-5GU3]; Rowena Coetsee, Antioch Will Face Bankruptcy if
Half-Cent Sales Tax Expires, Finance Official Says, E. Bay Times (Apr. 26, 2017, 12:32 PM),
http://www.eastbaytimes.com/2017/04/26/antioch-will-face-bankruptcy-if-half-cent-sales-tax-
expires-finance-official-says/ [https://perma.cc/V4RQ-Q4UV] (describing the financial predic-
ament of the small city of Antioch, California).
15. See, e.g., Parikh & He, supra note 7, at 601 (describing Moody’s downgrade of Chi-
cago’s bond rating to junk status and noting that the city is “not alone” in its financial strug-
gles); Romy Varghese, Even San Francisco, Flush with Tech Wealth, Has Pension Problems,
Bloomberg (Mar. 20, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-
20/even-san-francisco-flush-with-tech-wealth-has-pension-problems [https://perma.cc/SX65-
FV83] (noting that San Francisco’s pension cost is projected to rise three times faster than the
city’s revenue).
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exist at the state level, constraining states’ abilities to assist their municipali-
ties.16 To address these concerns, Congress has indicated that it will review
the bankruptcy system’s “responsiveness to the needs of financially troub-
led” municipalities in the coming year.17 Indeed, although alternatives to
bankruptcy exist, when municipalities are facing debt overhang and the need
for breathing space, bankruptcy ought to be a serious consideration.18
Recent events have reinforced the importance of critically examining the
tools municipalities have at their disposal to resolve fiscal distress. In early
May of 2017, Puerto Rico filed the largest government bankruptcy in U.S.
history.19 Other governmental entities, including territories, states, and mu-
nicipalities, will be closely watching Puerto Rico as it navigates the un-
charted waters of its unique bankruptcy proceedings.20
Although many scholars have turned to the study of municipal bank-
ruptcy in recent years,21 a key problem remains understudied in this context:
the difficulty judges face when applying bankruptcy’s generalized plan con-
firmation standards to the highly specialized entities that come before
them.22 Municipalities, like other debtor entities, need relief that is tailored
to their unique situations; however, bankruptcy is a much more general
16. Parikh & He, supra note 7, at 602 (“States have been disengaged from the municipal
restructuring process.”); Jenna Carlesso, Hartford Moves Closer to Bankruptcy, Soliciting Pro-
posals from Law Firms, Hartford Courant (May 9, 2017, 9:10 PM), http://www.courant.
com/community/hartford/hc-hartford-bankruptcy-lawyer-20170509-story.html [https://per
ma.cc/3ZT4-UEFR] (describing Hartford’s need for state assistance to help it avoid financial
ruin and Connecticut’s estimated $2 billion budget gap, which necessarily limits the assistance
the state can provide to its municipalities); Morgan Lee, Cash-Strapped New Mexico Reconsid-
ers Savings Strategy, Wash. Times (May 18, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2017/may/18/cash-strapped-new-mexico-may-overhaul-savings-stra/ [https://perma.cc/Z6BZ-
EF53] (discussing New Mexico’s budget crisis).
17. Legislative Highlights, Am. Bankr. Inst. J., Mar. 2017, at 10.
18. Coordes, Gatekeepers, supra note 4, 1212–13 (describing the unique benefits of mu-
nicipal bankruptcy).
19. Notice of Commencement of Cases Under Title III of PROMESA, Entry of Order for
Relief and Related Matters, In re The Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. of P.R., No. 17 BK 3283-LTS
(D.P.R. May 3, 2017), ECF No. 243-1; Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Files for Biggest Ever U.S. Local
Government Bankruptcy, Reuters (May 3, 2017, 3:34 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-puertorico-debt-bankruptcy/puerto-rico-files-for-biggest-ever-u-s-local-government-bank
ruptcy-idUSKBN17Z1UC [https://perma.cc/8X5W-9HGA?type=image].
20. See Kate Smith & Amanda Albright, Muni-Bond Vultures Rethink Risks Lurking in
Market’s Junk Yard, Bloomberg (May 30, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-05-30/muni-bond-vultures-rethink-risks-lurking-in-market-s-junk-yard [https://
perma.cc/6V7Z-FWH3] (discussing potential effects of Puerto Rico’s bankruptcy-like proceed-
ings on states); see also David R. Doyle, The Puerto Rico “Bankruptcy”: A Cheat Sheet, Am.
Bankr. Inst., https://www.abi.org/feed-item/the-puerto-rico-%E2%80%9Cbankruptcy%E2%
80%9D-a-cheat-sheet [https://perma.cc/VCX7-RJD7] (“[A]lthough PROMESA only applies to
Puerto Rico, some commentators believe that the Act may provide a statutory framework that
could be adapted to address any financial crises facing the nation’s states.”).
21. For an in-depth discussion of the scholarly literature on municipal bankruptcy, see
infra Section I.B.
22. See generally Robert F. Salvin, Student Loans, Bankruptcy, and the Fresh Start Policy:
Must Debtors Be Impoverished to Discharge Educational Loans?, 71 Tul. L. Rev. 139 (1996)
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toolkit. This problem’s seeming simplicity belies its prevalence—this diffi-
culty is present in the insolvency and restructuring context in both the
United States and abroad, and is by no means isolated to chapter 9.
Studying this problem in the larger bankruptcy context reveals a com-
mon theme: judges turn to experts to overcome inherent limitations with
the plan confirmation standards. In chapter 9, these experts often possess
specialized knowledge of mediation, municipal finance, or the municipality
itself. These experts investigate financial problems, mediate disputes, assess
the positions of disparate parties, and provide information to the judge
about the particulars of a debtor’s situation.23 In analyzing the involvement
of experts in chapter 9, this Article illuminates a startling fact—despite the
importance of experts to these cases, an expert’s selection, appointment, and
roles are given little forethought. Instead, experts in chapter 9 are handled
on a largely ad hoc basis. Often, judges simply appoint a colleague to man-
age important aspects of a case, giving this newly appointed expert wide-
ranging powers and responsibilities that go well beyond what the judge is
able to do in the case. After exploring the roles experts play in chapter 9 and
beyond, this Article advocates for the establishment of formal procedures for
appointing and using experts in the chapter 9 context and provides specific
guidance as to what these procedures should look like.
Chapter 9 thus serves as a vehicle to examine the role of experts in bank-
ruptcy. Because of the relative lack of precedent in chapter 9 compared to
other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, experts in chapter 9 can take on a
particularly outsized role. Yet, the problems experts are seeking to resolve are
present outside of chapter 9 as well, so studying the appointment and use of
experts in chapter 9 is beneficial to understanding the ways experts can and
should be used throughout bankruptcy.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides an overview of mu-
nicipal bankruptcy, the chapter 9 plan confirmation standards, and the chal-
lenges chapter 9 judges face in applying general principles to complex
situations. Part II reviews recent chapter 9 confirmation decisions and
reveals that judges often turn to experts such as specialists and mediators to
facilitate the plan confirmation process. Unfortunately, the current, ad hoc
use of experts in these cases raises concerns about experts exercising rela-
tively unchecked power, as well as the structural and constitutional implica-
tions of judges unilaterally exercising control over their selection and
appointment process. To address these concerns, Part III explores proposals
and processes from other areas of bankruptcy law that have been put for-
ward with respect to experts. This Part then proposes formal processes for
the selection, appointment, and use of experts in chapter 9, including estab-
lishing a pool of vetted experts and defining the experts’ role in a hearing at
the outset of the case. In addition to discussing the possible roles for the
(describing a similar difficulty in the student loan context of personal bankruptcies and pro-
posing a model for applying the undue-hardship standard for student loans in a manner con-
sistent with bankruptcy’s fresh start policy).
23. For an in-depth discussion of the roles these experts play, see infra Section II.A.
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expert beyond those currently used on an informal basis, Part III explains
how formal procedures will minimize the dangers of ad hoc expert use. Part
III concludes by calling for Congress and the states to develop formal proce-
dures for involving experts in chapter 9 and by encouraging further research
into how experts are used across the bankruptcy spectrum. Developing pro-
cedures will address more concretely problems with applying the plan con-
firmation standards, make bankruptcy a more palatable option for reluctant
debtors who nevertheless need its toolkit, and assuage concerns over the
power exercised by both judges and experts. Furthermore, studying the se-
lection, appointment, and use of experts throughout bankruptcy law can
draw attention to these entities and their significant ability to shape a case.
I. The Challenges of Plan Confirmation
This Part begins with an overview of chapter 9 bankruptcy and the stan-
dards for confirming a municipal plan of adjustment. Section I.A illustrates
the ways in which the plan confirmation standards fall short of achieving
their primary purposes. Because these standards are imported from a differ-
ent chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, they were not designed with municipal
debtors in mind. As a result, judges often have difficulty making sense of the
standards in the chapter 9 context, and the confirmation standards thus
serve as less effective protection, for both debtors and creditors, in chapter 9.
Section I.B surveys the scholarly literature on chapter 9 bankruptcy plan
confirmation, concluding that a key bankruptcy problem has been under-
studied in the chapter 9 context: the inherent difficulty of applying genera-
lized standards to particularized situations.
A. Municipal Bankruptcy and Plan Confirmation Standards
Chapter 9 is the part of the Bankruptcy Code used to address municipal
debt. Only municipalities, as defined in the Code, may use chapter 9, and if
an entity meets the Code’s definition of a municipality, it is not eligible to
use any other chapter of the Code.24 Upon filing for chapter 9, a municipal-
ity receives the benefit of the automatic stay, which prohibits creditors from
pursuing repayment remedies.25 After determining that a municipality is eli-
gible for chapter 9, a bankruptcy judge’s primary task is to decide whether to
confirm a plan of debt adjustment that the municipality submits.26 This plan
may be confirmed over the objection of creditors.27 To determine whether
24. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(40), 109(c) (2012).
25. Id. §§ 362(a), 901(a).
26. Peter J. Benvenutti et al., Jones Day, An Overview of Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code: Municipal Debt Adjustment (2010), http://www.jonesday.com/files/
Publication/d518067b-5e02-47c5-9768-fc692bb8ccd8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/55c
686be-d108-4786-aee6-de946542d3da/Chapter%209%20Municipal%20Debt.pdf (on file with
the Michigan Law Review).
27. Id.
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the plan should be confirmed, the judge relies on the confirmation stan-
dards enumerated in the Bankruptcy Code.28
Chapter 9 thus offers municipalities two key tools. First, chapter 9 allows
for municipalities to adjust debt on a nonconsensual basis.29 Second, chapter
9, through the imposition of the automatic stay, provides breathing space so
that municipalities can develop a plan to address their debts and put them-
selves back on a path to fiscal health.30
The plan confirmation standards are found in § 943 of the Bankruptcy
Code.31 Among other more technical requirements, the confirmation stan-
dards require chapter 9 plans to be proposed in good faith, in the best inter-
ests of creditors, feasible, and not be prohibited by law.32 The bankruptcy
judge must independently determine that a plan meets these confirmation
requirements, regardless of whether a creditor objects.33 If a municipality
seeks to “cram down” a plan over the objections of a creditor class, it must
also demonstrate that the plan does not discriminate unfairly and that it is
fair and equitable to creditors.34
The chapter 9 plan confirmation standards play an important role in
helping municipalities achieve their bankruptcy goals. In addition, the plan
confirmation standards are intended to balance the needs of debtors against
28. Id.
29. See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 159–60 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (“In chapter
9 . . . the federal government offers help to the states in solving a problem that . . . the states
cannot solve by themselves. That problem is the adjustment of the debts of an insolvent mu-
nicipality.”); C. Scott Pryor, Municipal Bankruptcy: When Doing Less is Doing Best, 88 Am.
Bankr. L.J. 85, 114 (2014) (“Without the Bankruptcy Clause or its consent, the rights of a
minority cannot be affected by a majority.”); Francisco Vazquez, Examining Chapter 9 Munici-
pal Bankruptcy Cases, in Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Strategies: Leading Lawyers on Navi-
gating the Chapter 9 Filing Process, Counseling Municipalities, and Analyzing
Recent Trends and Cases 173, 177 (Jo Alice Darden ed., 2011) (noting that a state cannot
bind nonconsenting creditors to a state-debt adjustment procedure).
30. In re City of San Bernardino, 499 B.R. 776, 791 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2013) (noting that
a purpose of chapter 9 is to provide “a municipality a breathing space . . . and an opportunity
to address its long term solvency through an organized process”); Christine Sgarlata Chung,
Municipal Bankruptcy, Essential Municipal Services, and Taxpayers’ Voice, 24 Widener L.J. 43,
55 (2015) (noting that chapter 9 is designed to “foster[ ] the continua[nce] of municipalities
rather than their dissolution” because municipalities must continue to provide essential ser-
vices (quoting In re Addison Cmty. Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. 646, 648 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994)));
Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
403, 458 (2014) (noting that chapter 9 gives municipalities breathing room consistent with
chapter 9’s goals of a fresh start and rehabilitation).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 943 (2012).
32. Id. Section 943(b)(1) provides that a plan must comply with bankruptcy provisions
made applicable by § 901. Section 901(a) indicates which of the chapter 11 plan confirmation
requirements apply in chapter 9, including, for example, the good faith requirement. Id.
§§ 901(a), 1129(a)(3).
33. In re Valley Health Sys., 429 B.R. 692, 710 n.45 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2010) (“The court
has an independent obligation to determine that a proposed plan meets the confirmation
requirements . . . notwithstanding creditor approval.”).
34. Benvenutti et al., supra note 26, at 10.
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the fair treatment of creditors.35 Thus, the confirmation standards are also
meant to serve a protective function for creditors, helping to ensure that the
debtor does not engage in manipulative or bad faith behavior.
Unfortunately, the plan confirmation standards fall short in these re-
spects. One likely reason is that the confirmation standards are imported
nearly wholesale from chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, the chapter used
primarily to reorganize business debts.36 Due to the vastly different nature of
municipal and business debtors, chapter 11 standards simply cannot be ap-
plied in the same way in the chapter 9 context. For example, the best interest
of creditors test is applied in chapter 11 by asking what a creditor would
receive if the debtor liquidated and comparing that result to one under the
debtor’s reorganization plan.37 In chapter 9, no liquidation alternative ex-
ists.38 Instead, courts have generally found the chapter 9 best interests test to
require “that a proposed plan provide a better alternative for creditors than
what they already have.”39 In practice, this is a much easier test to meet, as
for many creditors the only alternative to a debtor’s plan is dismissal and
resort to largely ineffective state remedies.40
As another example, judges have often found the feasibility requirement
to be particularly difficult to assess in chapter 9. This is because a municipal-
ity’s ability to adhere to the proposals in its plan is necessarily constrained
by the interplay of state and local laws, customs, and changing voter prefer-
ences.41 Not only are municipalities affected by state and federal law, but
municipal failure (and recovery) can impose costs and benefits on the re-
gion, state, and nation as well.42 Thus, although municipalities use bank-
ruptcy in part to put themselves on a path to fiscal health, the plan
35. See Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 543
(1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (highlighting the adjustment of the debtor-creditor relation-
ship as a key goal of bankruptcy law); Moringiello, supra note 30, at 482–83 (describing how
confirmation encourages cooperation between debtors and creditors).
36. See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (importing standards); § 1129(a)(3) (good faith and not for-
bidden by law); § 1129(a)(7) (best interests); § 1129(a)(11) (feasible); § 1129(b)(1) (fair and
equitable and no unfair discrimination).
37. David S. Kupetz, Standards for Confirming a Chapter 9 Plan of Debt Adjustment: In-
corporating and Diverging from Chapter 11 Plan Standards, 32 Cal. Bankr. J. 289, 313 (2012).
38. Id.
39. In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 34 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999); see also
Pryor, supra note 29, at 120 (“[C]ontemporary courts generally give little weight to the best
interests test . . . .”).
40. In re Mount Carbon, 242 B.R. at 33 (“The only alternative to Chapter 9 is restructur-
ing by the municipality in accordance with state law, which may be difficult and may require
voter approval . . . .”).
41. See, e.g., R. Craig Martin, Après nous le déluge: Municipal Debt, Sovereign Debt—
What’s Next?, INSOL World, Second Quarter 2017, at 19 (comments of Kevyn Orr) (noting
that municipalities often have an “existing infrastructure” and considerable legislation with
respect to how a municipality must interact with creditors, and that these elements “add com-
plications to the functioning of core governmental services”); Nadav Shoked, Debt Limits’ End,
102 Iowa L. Rev. 1239, 1241 (2017) (noting that “the law . . . treats local governments strik-
ingly differently from” other debtors by placing limits on local government debt).
42. Parikh & He, supra note 7, at 606.
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confirmation standards, by themselves, do not ensure this result due to the
complex, interconnected nature of municipalities and their particular local,
state, and federal settings.43
The confirmation standards also frequently do not achieve their creditor
protection function.44 The lack of plausible alternatives to chapter 9, com-
bined with ill-defined creditor priorities, makes application of even the most
straightforward plan confirmation standards difficult to achieve.45 For exam-
ple, the absolute priority rule, part of the fair and equitable test, is applied in
chapter 11 to ensure that objecting unsecured creditors get paid before more
junior classes of equity holders.46 In chapter 9, the absolute priority rule does
not provide unsecured creditors with similar protection because municipali-
ties do not have equity holders.47 In addition, the priorities of creditors in
chapter 9 are often unclear, due in part to the interplay between state statu-
tory and constitutional law and federal bankruptcy law.48 For example, if a
state has constitutional protections for pensions, those protections may serve
to elevate pensioners above bondholders, even though bankruptcy law
would treat both creditors equally.49 Although some judges have held that
state law should not influence bankruptcy priorities, the law remains unset-
tled at this point, making application of the absolute priority rule in chapter
9 less certain than in chapter 11 and opening the door for parties to
43. Cf. Nat’l Bankr. Review Comm’n, General Issues in Chapter 11, at 85 (1997),
Westlaw 1997 WL 985132 (“Even the most carefully crafted plans of reorganization sometimes
encounter circumstances that warrant adjustment.”). Although this article discusses plan con-
firmation in the chapter 11 context, the same concerns exist in chapter 9.
44. See Coordes, Gatekeepers, supra note 4, at 1220 (discussing the confirmation stan-
dards’ inadequate creditor protections and resulting creditor behavior); Deitch, supra note 3,
at 2726 (“[C]reditors have limited recourse once the [chapter 9] petition is accepted, as the
municipal debtor can spend and borrow without court approval and bind creditors to a con-
firmed plan.”).
45. See Pryor, supra note 29, at 120 (describing chapter 9’s priority scheme, but noting
that some scholars would contest this account and instead argue that “state priorities should
control bankruptcy fairness”).
46. See generally Morris J. Massel, A Guide to the Ch. 11 Initiating Process, Law360 (Oct.
30, 2013, 4:58 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/484695/a-guide-to-the-ch-11-initiating-
process (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
47. In re Corcoran Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 458 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999) (noting that
the absolute priority rule “must be interpreted somewhat differently” in chapter 9).
48. The situation in Puerto Rico is an illustrative parallel to priority problems in chapter
9. Two different classes of bondholders are disputing who should have priority claims to cer-
tain money. The priority question in Puerto Rico, like similar questions in chapter 9 proceed-
ings, involves issues of constitutional and statutory interpretation. See Emma Orr & Michelle
Kaske, Puerto Rico Bondholders Deny Legitimacy of Each Other’s Debt, Bloomberg (May 25,
2017, 5:59 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-23/puerto-rico-bond-
holders-say-everybody-and-nobody-has-valid-claim [https://perma.cc/SXV9-H8BZ].
49. See Andrew B. Dawson, Beyond the Great Divide: Federalism Concerns in Municipal
Insolvency, 11 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 31, 35 (2017).
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manipulate the system.50 Lack of clarity with respect to priorities in bank-
ruptcy may also make creditors hesitant to lend to municipalities in the first
place.51
To further complicate matters, the person tasked with interpreting and
applying the confirmation standards—the bankruptcy judge—plays a very
limited role in a chapter 9 case.52 This is due in part to constitutional and
statutory constraints on the bankruptcy court; in essence, the court is not
able to supervise the municipality’s execution of its recovery and cannot
mandate a particular path for the municipality to take.53 Section 904 of the
Bankruptcy Code prohibits the judge from taking measures like forcing a
municipality to change its governing structure or directing the municipality
on how to spend its money or use its property.54 In contrast, in a chapter 11
case, the debtor must receive court approval to use, sell, or lease its property
outside of the ordinary course of business.55 Furthermore, while a judge in a
chapter 11 case may decide to confirm a plan submitted by a creditor or
other party in interest, a chapter 9 judge cannot force the municipality to
adopt a plan that is not proposed by the municipality itself.56 Although
judges in practice sometimes work around these limitations,57 on the whole,
a judge in chapter 9 does not have the same Code-sanctioned involvement in
a case as a chapter 11 judge, who can exercise more debtor oversight by, for
example, appointing a trustee or examiner in the case.58 The judge’s
relatively limited role in chapter 9 can make it difficult for the judge to
50. Vincent S.J. Buccola, Law and Legislation in Municipal Bankruptcy, 38 Cardozo L.
Rev. 1301, 1316 (2017) (noting that, at least in some instances, creditor priorities in chapter 9
are not well established); Andrew Hedlund, Supremacy’s Claws: How Two Judges Are Changing
the Pension Debate, Deal (Mar. 6, 2015) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (discussing
bankruptcy cases where judges stated that constitutionally protected pensions could be cut).
51. Cf. Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., Governmental Intervention in an Eco-
nomic Crisis, 19 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 7, 32 (2016) (“If priorities are not respected, investors will be
more reluctant to lend during a crisis to companies that may later be subject to governmental
intervention.”).
52. See Moringiello, supra note 7, at 74–75 (addressing the lack of judicial review sur-
rounding confirmation standards in chapter 9 due to the relatively small number of cases).
53. See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 163 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012).
55. Id. § 363.
56. See id. § 941; Marc A. Levinson et al., Thompson Reuters: Practical Law,
Chapter 9 v. Chapter 11 Comparison Chart (2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/
cdn.orrick.com/files/Chapter9vChapter11ComparisonChartLevinsonPLB.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UC28-G2X2]; see also Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit
Bankruptcy, 33 Yale J. on Reg. 55, 58–59 (2016) (discussing ways judges can work around
limitations).
57. See Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance Reform and the Judicial Role
in Municipal Bankruptcy, 125 Yale L.J. 1150, 1206 (2016) (noting that a bankruptcy judge’s
ability to withhold plan confirmation allows the court to overcome § 904’s limitations).
58. § 1104. Limited postbankruptcy oversight is also a problem. For example, the City of
San Bernardino, California, recently deviated from its court-approved bankruptcy plan be-
cause it did not expect to be able to hire police as fast as its budget calls for. Ryan Hagen, San
Bernardino Budget Proposal Follows Bankruptcy Plan, Except for Police, San Bernardino Cty.
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understand the parties and the financial issues at stake when a municipality
proposes a plan of adjustment.
In sum, the confirmation standards produce uncertainty because they
cannot be applied to ensure that a municipality is treating its creditors fairly
or producing a fair and feasible plan. Though derived primarily from chap-
ter 11, the tests are much weaker in the chapter 9 context. Even in chapter
11, the confirmation standards do not guarantee success.59 It is much more
difficult to achieve a certain outcome in chapter 9, where the same tests are
applied with even less relevance.
Although the chapter 9 plan confirmation standards are difficult to ap-
ply and do not themselves put municipalities on a path to fiscal health,
changing these standards is daunting for both legal and political reasons.
First, chapter 9 strikes a delicate constitutional balance, allowing a federal
judge to oversee procedures that necessarily influence the way that munici-
palities are run as well as the ways in which they interact with their states.60
Any efforts to formally give the judge more power at plan confirmation risk
running afoul of the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of powers to the states.
Even if a change to the confirmation standards passes legal muster, however,
it would likely face steep political obstacles, as both state and local officials
are sensitive to perceived attempts to encroach on their powers.61
Therefore, despite their limitations, it is unlikely that the plan confirma-
tion standards can be significantly altered. Nevertheless, as Section I.B will
illustrate, scholars have not been deterred from making suggestions to im-
prove chapter 9 and its plan confirmation process.
B. Proposals for Reform
The scholarly literature contains many observations about problems
with chapter 9, as well as proposals for improvement.62 Broadly speaking,
Sun (May 10, 2017, 7:50 PM), http://www.sbsun.com/2017/05/10/san-bernardino-budget-pro
posal-follows-bankruptcy-plan-except-for-police/ [https://perma.cc/LZ83-5XAC].
59. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 597 (1993) (discussing
chapter 11 “success,” defined in various ways, in the context of large public company
reorganizations).
60. For a detailed discussion of the constitutional concerns surrounding chapter 9, see
David E. Solan, State Bankruptcy: Surviving a Tenth Amendment Challenge, 42 Golden Gate
U. L. Rev. 217 (2012). See also Chung, supra note 30, at 57–59 (discussing how the goals of
chapter 9 bankruptcy interact with the Tenth Amendment); Dawson, supra note 49, at 32
(“While the power to adjust financial operations is squarely within Congress’s power to ‘enact
uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies,’ the states retain the power to govern their mu-
nicipalities.” (quoting U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 4)).
61. See Coordes, Gatekeepers, supra note 4, at 1229–30 (discussing the rhetoric and fear
surrounding chapter 9).
62. See, e.g., Daniel DiSalvo & Stephen Eide, Manhattan Inst., When Cities Are
at the Financial Brink (2017) (noting disagreement over how to make chapter 9 more
effective); Chung, supra note 30, at 61 (providing an overview of when courts have allowed
taxpayers to appear as parties-in-interest); Christine Sgarlata Chung, Zombieland/The Detroit
Bankruptcy: Why Debts Associated with Pensions, Benefits, and Municipal Securities Never
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the problems identified fall into three categories. First, many scholars believe
the confirmation standards, and chapter 9 more generally, are ineffective
because cities emerge from the process and continue to visibly struggle with
debt.63 Second, chapter 9 suffers from an inherently limited scope: due to the
constitutional limitations discussed above, municipal bankruptcy can only
address financial issues and not governance issues, which are often at the
root of financial problems.64 A related problem is the limited role of the
bankruptcy judge and the degree of constitutional limitations on that role.65
Third, as discussed in more detail above, chapter 9’s confirmation standards
are difficult to apply in practice because they are both facially unclear and
lack relevant precedent.66
To address these problems within the chapter 9 context, existing propos-
als suggest making specific changes to chapter 9 or the plan confirmation
Die . . . And How They Are Killing Cities Like Detroit, 41 Fordham Urb. L.J. 771, 779 (2014)
(proposing earlier intervention by state and local governments and a fiduciary standard for
public officials and other stakeholders to protect the municipality’s long-term best interest);
Nathan E. Enfield, The Logic and Limits of Chapter 9: The Case of Police, 2016 U. Chi. Legal F.
739, 740 (discussing the limitations of chapter 9 in addressing police crises); Richard M. Hynes
& Steven D. Walt, Fair and Unfair Discrimination in Municipal Bankruptcy, 37 Campbell L.
Rev. 25, 28–29 (2015) (arguing that a judge cannot approve a plan that provides retirees and
active workers with a greater recovery than other creditors); Jacoby, supra note 56, at 58 (stud-
ying court oversight in the Detroit bankruptcy); Moringiello, supra note 30, at 409 (arguing
that an understanding of chapter 9 as an “integrated scheme for municipal financial recovery”
is essential to considering changes to chapter 9); Julie A. Roin, Retroactive Taxation, Unfunded
Pensions, and Shadow Bankruptcies, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 559, 579–80 (2017) (noting that voters
bear some of the blame for continuing to vote for politicians that create poor financial situa-
tions and proposing to hold voters partially accountable through retroactive taxation).
63. See, e.g., Buccola, supra note 50, at 1337 (describing how uncertainty in chapter 9 is
harmful to cities); Karol K. Denniston, Neutral Evaluation in Chapter 9 Bankruptcies: Mitigat-
ing Municipal Distress, 32 Cal. Bankr. J. 261, 263–64 (2012) (noting that chapter 9 may do
more harm than good and proposing a neutral evaluation process similar to California’s).
64. See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 49, at 33–34 (noting that chapter 9 only addresses fi-
nancial problems and not the root causes of those problems and proposing to move toward a
functional approach that recognizes the overlap between debt and governance); Gillette &
Skeel, supra note 57, at 1153 (noting that chapter 9 does not effectively address governance
issues but arguing that it can and should); Andrew Sallway, Hot Topics—Avoid Being Burnt!,
INSOL World, Second Quarter 2017, at 28 (comments of Gaurav Malhotra) (describing a
“scoop and toss” approach to insolvency, where financial restructuring occurs without a long-
term plan for operational success).
65. But see Jacoby, supra note 56, at 72 (discussing how judges might work around these
limitations, as well as concerns that might arise when they do).
66. See, e.g., Buccola, supra note 50, at 1339–40 (proposing legislative reforms to chapter
9’s structure to clarify substantive rights); Deitch, supra note 3, at 2726–28 (noting that it is
unclear how to determine whether a plan is fair and proposing that courts differentiate be-
tween onetime event bankruptcies and structurally imbalanced bankruptcies); John Patrick
Hunt, Taxes and Ability to Pay in Municipal Bankruptcy, 91 Wash. L. Rev. 515, 523 (2016)
(noting that it is unclear how courts are supposed to look at tax levels and arguing that courts
should require a municipality to tax at the top of its peer group as a condition of plan confir-
mation); Moringiello, supra note 7, at 74–75 (noting that confirmation standards are underde-
veloped and proposing a clearer role for state choices in the bankruptcy process to help
interpret the confirmation standards).
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requirements, including expanding the scope of the feasibility requirement
and clarifying the unfair discrimination requirement.67 Other scholars seek
to reexamine the federalism questions surrounding chapter 9 with the inten-
tion of redefining its scope. For example, Clayton Gillette and David Skeel
propose that judges use the feasibility plan confirmation requirement to ad-
dress governance issues,68 and John Patrick Hunt argues that Congress could
use municipal bankruptcy to constitutionally preempt state constitutional
limits on municipal taxes.69
Largely absent from the literature is a discussion of an often-obscured
yet inherent problem: the chapter 9 plan confirmation standards are general
principles that are not structured for application to the specific, complex
problems that municipalities face.70 No two municipalities are alike; rather,
municipalities are varied in ways too numerous to count. Previous research
has established that municipalities differ vastly from one another in terms of
structure, governance ability, legal constraints, and much more.71 The in-
depth knowledge needed to assess whether a municipality is complying with
the intent of the plan confirmation requirements is therefore significant.
67. See, e.g., Andrew B. Dawson, Pensioners, Bondholders, and Unfair Discrimination in
Municipal Bankruptcy, 17 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 1, 3–6 (2014) (noting that unfair discrimination for
pensioners vis-à-vis other creditors is unclear and proposing that unfair discrimination mean
the same thing it does in chapter 11); Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities
Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 425, 466
(1993) (discussing how bankruptcy courts can use the confirmation requirements to influence
governance); C. Scott Pryor, Who Pays the Price? The Necessity of Taxpayer Participation in
Chapter 9, 24 Widener L.J. 81, 85 (2015) (arguing that courts should use feasibility to take
taxpayer interests into account).
68. Gillette & Skeel, supra note 57, at 1156.
69. John Patrick Hunt, Constitutionalized Consent: Preemption of State Tax Limits in Mu-
nicipal Bankruptcy, 34 Yale J. on Reg. 391, 394 (2017). There is also substantial literature
arguing for increased intervention outside of bankruptcy, for example in the form of oversight
or control boards. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Dictatorships for Democracy: Takeovers of Finan-
cially Failed Cities, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1373, 1384 (2014) (advocating expanding the authority
of state-run takeover boards); Parikh & He, supra note 7, at 605 (suggesting that states should
offer meaningful debt-restructuring options both within and outside the bankruptcy context).
Yet, as I have argued in previous work, chapter 9 offers distinct, unique benefits as well as
targeted relief to address particular problems. Coordes, Gatekeepers, supra note 4. For this
reason, this Article’s focus is on improving the chapter 9 system itself; although improvements
outside of the chapter 9 context are valuable and desirable, improvements within chapter 9
must also be made so that municipalities can use chapter 9 when they need its distinct tools.
70. See Frank Shafroth, The Key Lessons Learned After a Decade of Municipal Bankrupt-
cies, GMU Mun. Sustainability Project (Apr. 7, 2017), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.
com/2017/04/07/the-key-lessons-learned-after-a-decade-of-municipal-bankruptcies/ [https://
perma.cc/NB25-54BD] (“Debt adjustment is a process, but a recovery plan is a solution . . . .
[T]he plan provides additional breathing room so that the municipality . . . may proceed with
a recovery plan, reinvest . . . stimulate the economy, create new jobs . . . and raise the level of
services and infrastructure to that which is acceptable and attract new business and new
citizens.”).
71. See generally Coordes & Reilly, supra note 7 (charting these differences through de-
tailed case studies).
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Thus, the chapter 9 plan confirmation standards are not tailored to munici-
palities’ specific situations, and applying them to chapter 9 plans requires an
understanding of the municipality and its underlying issues that bankruptcy
judges often cannot obtain by themselves. The next Part explores the ways in
which judges address this problem in practice, as well as concerns raised by
the way in which they are proceeding.
II. Overcoming Chapter 9’s Limitations
Difficulties with applying chapter 9’s plan confirmation standards arise
for three primary reasons. First, there is little relevant precedent, both be-
cause of the rarity of municipal bankruptcy and because the entities that
have used it differ vastly from one another. Unlike in chapter 11, for exam-
ple, there is no substantial body of precedent for a judge to draw upon in
applying the plan confirmation standards.72 Second, and relatedly, municipal
entities are not self-contained.73 Even municipalities with so-called “home
rule” authority, or the ability to self-govern, often differ substantially from
one another in terms of the powers they are able to exercise without request-
ing state authority or assistance.74 No municipality exists in a vacuum; each
is influenced and directed by federal,75 state,76 regional,77 and local
72. Transcript of Bench Decision at 16, 49, In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 2014) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 8257.
73. See Beauchamp-Velazquez v. Dep’t of Educ. of P.R., No. 3:17-01419-WGY, 2017 WL
4228047, at *2 (D.P.R. July 13, 2017) (acknowledging “the difficulties of applying bankruptcy
principles to government entities,” which “are not capitalist for-profit entities”).
74. See generally Frug & Barron, supra note 5 (detailing limitations on home rule and
municipal self-governance).
75. See, e.g., Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Authorizes Debt Payment Suspension; Obama Signs
Rescue Bill, Reuters (June 30, 2016, 12:06 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-puertori
co-debt/puerto-rico-authorizes-debt-payment-suspension-obama-signs-rescue-bill-idUSKC
N0ZG09Y [https://perma.cc/C7NE-S57E] (describing how the federal statute PROMESA was
designed to aid Puerto Rico in the face of litigation precipitated by default).
76. For an example of a municipality’s complex fiscal relationship with its state, see
Frank Shafroth, Perspectives on Municipal Bankruptcy, GMU Mun. Sustainability Project
(May 16, 2017), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2017/05/16/perspectives-on-munici
pal-bankruptcy/ [https://perma.cc/VT59-DYKQ] (describing the Connecticut governor’s pro-
posal to shift teacher pension costs to municipalities, which S&P has noted “may pressure local
government finances”).
77. See, e.g., Frug & Barron, supra note 5, at ch. 10 (asserting that central cities’ rela-
tionships with their neighbors are of critical economic importance).
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practices,78 laws,79 politics,80 and customs.81 Thus, what each municipality
needs in order to exit bankruptcy and establish fiscal health will be different
in every case, and the judge must understand this complex interplay well
enough if he or she is to apply the confirmation standards effectively.
Finally, as previously discussed, the chapter 9 plan confirmation stan-
dards do not provide much certainty or clarity. Because chapter 9 is not
itself a panacea, a municipality’s long-term recovery necessarily exceeds what
it can do in bankruptcy.82 Thus, chapter 9 plan confirmation only provides
partial relief to a struggling municipality: the ultimate goal of a financially
stable entity cannot be achieved without further efforts.
Despite these shortcomings, chapter 9 cases progress, and judges con-
firm plans of adjustment. Thus, many of the problems identified in the the-
oretical literature have been experienced and addressed in practice. In large
part, judges turn to experts for help overcoming bankruptcy’s inherent
shortcomings. Indeed, experts can help all parties to a case maximize bank-
ruptcy’s toolkit by solving strategic bargaining problems and revealing hid-
den information. By providing an informed picture of the municipality’s
finances and unique situation to the bankruptcy judge, experts can make
good use of a municipality’s time in bankruptcy. Similarly, experts who take
on the role of a mediator can assist with bankruptcy negotiations by provid-
ing a neutral sounding board and facilitating settlements.
A. Chapter 9 Cases
The following cases illustrate the difficulties judges face when applying
the chapter 9 plan confirmation standards, as well as the ways that judges
have overcome these difficulties in practice. The Detroit bankruptcy, an
enormously complex endeavor indicative of both the problems with chapter
9 bankruptcies and the practical solutions that can be applied to these
problems, is the feature of this subsection. Three other examples of general
78. Many municipal fiscal issues are rooted in years, if not decades, of mistakes and poor
management. See, e.g., Martin Z. Braun & Jonathan Levin, Debt Island: How $74 Billion in
Bonds Bankrupted Puerto Rico, Bloomberg (May 15, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloom
berg.com/news/articles/2017-05-15/debt-island-how-74-billion-in-bonds-bankrupted-puerto-
rico [https://perma.cc/3LQQ-NTQL] (describing Puerto Rico’s longstanding fiscal issues and
noting that the Commonwealth has not “filed audited financial statements since its 2014 fiscal
year”).
79. See, e.g., id. (noting that Puerto Rico borrowed at a “turbo-charged” rate because its
debt was legally exempt from taxation).
80. See, e.g., Keith M. Phaneuf, Bankruptcy for Hartford May Hinge on CT Tax Debate,
Conn. Mirror (May 15, 2017), https://ctmirror.org/2017/05/15/bankruptcy-for-hartford-
may-hinge-on-ct-tax-debate/ [https://perma.cc/RW5J-3EC9] (noting how the politics of taxa-
tion in Connecticut influence the state’s strategy toward the struggling city of Hartford).
81. See, e.g., Amy Padnani, Anatomy of Detroit’s Decline, N.Y. Times (Aug. 17, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/17/us/detroit-decline.html (on file with the
Michigan Law Review) (arguing that Detroit’s reliance on a single industry was a cause of its
financial decline).
82. Shafroth, supra note 14.
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purpose municipal bankruptcies provide additional insights into the value of
mediation and expertise in crafting a chapter 9 plan of adjustment.
1. Detroit, Michigan
When Detroit filed for bankruptcy in July of 2013, it was the largest
municipal bankruptcy the United States had seen to date.83 Facing approxi-
mately $18 billion in debt and lawsuits from dozens of unhappy creditors,
Detroit was undoubtedly ready for chapter 9 protection.84 Detroit also exited
bankruptcy in about seventeen months, a record time for such a large city.85
Two primary factors shaped Detroit’s bankruptcy experience. First, the
city entered numerous settlements with many key creditor groups.86 In his
confirmation opinion, Judge Rhodes, the bankruptcy judge overseeing the
case, praised these settlements as helping the entire bankruptcy process run
more smoothly and quickly and called them “ideal” for future
restructurings.87
Detroit reached these settlements primarily through the mediation pro-
cess. Indeed, Detroit’s most famous settlement, the Grand Bargain, which
involved the cooperation of the state of Michigan and several philanthropic
organizations, was brokered in mediation, though it was far from the only
deal to emerge from the process.88 Notably, mediation also resulted in a pen-
sion settlement that Judge Rhodes deemed “miraculous.”89 In fact, “through
court-ordered mediation, the City has achieved settlement with every credi-
tor group that was represented by counsel.”90
Although Judge Rhodes ordered the mediation, he did not oversee the
process himself. Rather, he appointed Chief U.S. District Judge Gerald Ro-
sen to be the case mediator.91 Judge Rosen and his team of five additional
83. Nathan Bomey et al., Detroit Becomes Largest U.S. City to Enter Bankruptcy, USA
Today (Dec. 3, 2013, 9:58 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/03/de-
troit-bankruptcy-eligibility/3849833/ [https://perma.cc/NS5T-W6E5].
84. Id.
85. Detroit on Track to Exit Bankruptcy in Record Time, Guardian (Aug. 31, 2016, 10:45
AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/31/detroit-bankruptcy-record-time-hear-
ing [https://perma.cc/8HC4-KEMQ]; see Christine Ferretti, Detroit Emerges From Bankruptcy
Today, Det. News (Dec. 10, 2014, 11:29 AM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/
wayne-county/2014/12/10/detroit-bankruptcy/20192957/ [https://perma.cc/C4Q6-VPQV]
(noting that Detroit filed for bankruptcy in July of 2013 and emerged on December 10, 2014).
86. Andrew Scurria, Detroit Wins Confirmation of $7B Debt-Cutting Plan, Law360 (Nov.
7, 2014, 1:03 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/594098/detroit-wins-confirmation-of-7b-
debt-cutting-plan (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
87. Id. (quoting Transcript of Bench Decision, supra note 72, at 29).
88. Id. The Grand Bargain enabled Detroit to exit bankruptcy. See id.
89. Id. (quoting Transcript of Bench Decision, supra note 72, at 10).
90. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 160 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
91. Id. at 168.
1266 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 116:1249
mediators were given expansive authority to supervise the settlement negoti-
ations between the city and its creditors, a process that the judge character-
ized as “fundamental to the City’s plan and its revitalization.”92 In addition
to allowing Detroit to avoid litigation, the settlements aided the judge in
applying the good faith plan confirmation standard. Judge Rhodes noted
that the settlements illustrated the city’s good faith in proposing its plan.93
The court called the settlement accomplishments “extraordinary in bank-
ruptcy.”94 Notably, Judge Rosen is widely acknowledged as the “architect” of
the Grand Bargain.95 In all, Judge Rhodes commented that appointing Judge
Rosen as mediator was “the smartest thing [he] did in this case.”96
The second notable feature of the Detroit bankruptcy was the involve-
ment of specialists. Even before the bankruptcy began, the state of Michigan
had selected Kevyn Orr, a prominent bankruptcy attorney, to serve as the
city’s emergency manager.97 Orr’s role was deemed “critical” to the city’s
success in bankruptcy; one analysis concluded that Detroit “benefited from
an objective, independent subject matter expert who, insulated from ballot
box risk, was willing to take politically unpopular but necessary measures.”98
Additionally, during the bankruptcy itself, Judge Rhodes appointed a feasi-
bility expert to assist him with plan confirmation.99 Detroit’s plan itself also
contemplated continued expert involvement postbankruptcy by creating a
financial review commission to supervise the city’s finances after it
emerged.100
The experts and professionals involved in Detroit’s bankruptcy proved
particularly valuable during the plan confirmation process, which was an
exercise in sheer information absorption. The court considered testimony
from forty-one witnesses at the confirmation hearing, as well as affidavits
and declarations included among approximately 2,300 exhibits admitted
into evidence.101 Prior to the hearing, the judge participated in a city tour
92. Id.
93. Id. at 248–49.
94. Id. at 248.
95. Sean T. Scott et al., 7 Lessons from the Detroit Bankruptcy, Law360 (Nov. 11, 2014,
7:44 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/595257/7-lessons-from-the-detroit-bankruptcy
(on file with the Michigan Law Review).
96. Mark N. Berman & Erik Schneider, Nixon Peabody LLP, Observations: Con-
firmation of the City of Detroit Chapter 9 Plan of Adjustment (2014), https://
www.nixonpeabody.com/-/media/Files/Alerts/172296_Bankruptcy_Alert_24NOV2014.ashx
[https://perma.cc/9PBW-P58W].
97. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 189; Monica Davey, Bankruptcy Lawyer Is Named to
Manage an Ailing Detroit, N.Y. Times (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/15/
us/gov-rick-snyder-kevyn-orr-emergency-manager-detroit.html (on file with the Michigan
Law Review).
98. Scott, supra note 95.
99. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 221.
100. Id. at 244.
101. Order Confirming Eighth Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of
Detroit at 5–6, In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (No. 13-53846),
ECF No. 8272.
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conducted by counsel for Detroit, during which the court observed blight in
the city firsthand.102 The court concluded that the tour was “enlightening
and valuable.”103
To determine whether the plan was in the best interests of creditors, the
court relied on testimony from a tax expert about whether, if creditors re-
sorted to state law, they would be able to collect anything from the city
based on a mandamus action.104 The court also heard testimony from the
city’s chief financial officer, mayor, and emergency manager on this issue.105
The court also used an independent expert witness to report on the
feasibility of the city’s plan.106 The expert, Martha Kopacz, produced three
detailed reports and provided testimony.107 Kopacz and her team reviewed
the plan projections, interviewed relevant parties, pored over thousands of
pages of documents, and critiqued the methodology, data, and information
used for the projections.108 The city also retained nine independent profes-
sionals to testify with respect to feasibility.109 Although several creditors ob-
jected to portions of Kopacz’s testimony, arguing that she lacked the
necessary qualifications to give certain opinions and that her investigations
exceeded the scope of her assignment to the court,110 the judge ultimately
overruled these objections.111
In his opinion on plan confirmation, Judge Rhodes stated that “the ef-
forts of Ms. Kopacz and her team were essential for the Court to discharge
its duty [regarding feasibility].”112 According to the judge, part of the diffi-
culty with the feasibility analysis was that “several key parts of the plan de-
pend[ed] upon performance by parties who are completely beyond the
City’s control.”113 Thus, the court relied heavily on Kopacz’s reports and
testimony to make an informed judgment on whether those parties would
perform as projected.
In his confirmation opinion, Judge Rhodes made clear that he under-
stood the problem of applying generalized standards to Detroit’s particular-
ized situation. He rejected all previously adopted standards for determining
whether the plan discriminates unfairly against classes of creditors, instead
concluding that “determining fairness is a matter of relying upon the judg-
ment of conscience.”114 In making this statement, Judge Rhodes suggested
102. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 166–67.
103. Id. at 167.
104. See id. at 214–15.
105. See id. at 223.
106. Id. at 221.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 226.
109. Id. at 223.
110. Id. at 222.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 221.
113. Id. at 220.
114. Id. at 255–56.
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that a more flexible standard of unfair discrimination is appropriate for
chapter 9 cases.115 Indeed, Judge Rhodes noted that “the primary focus of
the Court’s consideration . . . is on the needs of the City.”116
Judge Rhodes similarly took a flexible approach in applying the fair and
equitable requirement, which assesses whether the plan complies with bank-
ruptcy priorities. Judge Rhodes determined that the fair and equitable analy-
sis required both the absence of misconduct and an inquiry into
“circumstances in the case that suggest to the Court’s conscience that it is
fair and equitable to impose the plan on the dissenting creditors against
their stated will.”117 In all, the knowledge Judge Rhodes received from the
experts and from his city tour gave him the necessary tools to tailor the
confirmation standards to Detroit’s particular situation.
Finally, Judge Rhodes acknowledged the limitations of the role of ex-
perts in municipal bankruptcy. Although a fee examiner had been appointed
in the case, the court determined that it could not outsource a decision on
reasonableness of fees and that it had to make an independent decision re-
garding fees because this obligation was so closely linked to the fair and
equitable plan confirmation requirement.118
The aftermath of Detroit’s bankruptcy has not always been smooth, de-
spite the assistance of experts and professionals. In particular, Kevyn Orr
was challenged and criticized for many of the decisions he made as emer-
gency manager, and tensions flared when he was perceived as working at
cross purposes with local elected officials.119 Notably, Judge Rhodes ended
his opinion on confirmation by stating, “[i]t is now time to restore democ-
racy to the people of the City of Detroit,” suggesting that democracy, on
some level, had been supplanted by appointed officials.120 Nevertheless, the
outcome of Detroit’s plan and its flexible, comprehensive nature have
proven durable: the city’s finances have significantly improved,121 and it is
“on track to have its oversight board . . . become dormant in 2018.”122
115. Id. at 256.
116. Id. at 259.
117. Id. at 261.
118. Id. at 210.
119. See, e.g., Joe Guillen, Mayor Duggan: Kevyn Orr Hid Pension Plan Details; City May
Sue Firm, Det. Free Press (Feb. 23, 2017, 1:32 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/
michigan/detroit/2017/02/23/duggan-orr-detroit-bankruptcy-finances/98302920/ [https://
perma.cc/GJ4K-4LKF].
120. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 277.
121. Frank Shafroth, The Roads out of and into Insolvency, GMU Mun. Sustainability
Project (May 31, 2017), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2017/05/31/the-roads-out-
of-and-into-insolvency/ [https://perma.cc/W74E-CJK5] (noting that Detroit ended its 2016
fiscal year with a $63 million budget surplus, about $22 million higher than the city
projected).
122. Frank Shafroth, What Lessons Can State & Local Leaders Learn from Unique Fiscal
Challenges?, GMU Mun. Sustainability Project (Apr. 25, 2017), https://fiscalbankrupt
cy.wordpress.com/2017/04/25/what-lessons-can-state-local-leaders-learn-from-unique-fiscal-
challenges/ [https://perma.cc/U7W5-ZAA6].
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The mediation process was a cornerstone of Detroit’s bankruptcy suc-
cess.123 Additionally, experts played a significant role in assisting the judge
with applying the plan confirmation standards. Although the judge made
independent determinations about plan confirmation, his decisions were
greatly facilitated by the experts, as Judge Rhodes himself acknowledged in
his confirmation opinion.124 Judge Rosen as mediator helped take many is-
sues off the table at plan confirmation, and other experts worked to make
the confirmation requirements more concrete as they applied to Detroit.
Nevertheless, as Detroit’s experience with an emergency manager shows, ex-
perts can sometimes be viewed as interfering with the democratic process
and usurping the roles of elected officials. Similarly, creditor challenges to
the feasibility expert’s credibility and role illustrate the potential for obsta-
cles when judge-appointed experts are used in chapter 9.
Notably, although Judge Rosen’s appointment as mediator undoubtedly
helped speed the case to conclusion, Judge Rhodes made the appointment
himself, effectively conveying significant authority to an individual who had
not been vetted or approved by anyone other than the bankruptcy judge.
Thus, although the city’s creditors ultimately agreed to a plan, they may have
done so only because they perceived that Judge Rosen (and, in turn, Judge
Rhodes) would not agree that the Grand Bargain—which Judge Rosen had
crafted—was not protective of their rights.125
Detroit’s bankruptcy also demonstrated the importance of conveying
information to Judge Rhodes. The city tour, though perhaps unorthodox,
gave the judge firsthand knowledge of aspects of the city he may not have
otherwise known and allowed him to use his own knowledge when confirm-
ing the city’s plan. Indeed, throughout the bankruptcy, Judge Rhodes made
clear that Detroit was not divorced from its surroundings, history, or state.
This recognition shaped how he applied the plan confirmation standards.
2. San Bernardino, California
San Bernardino’s bankruptcy process serves as an example of how the
absence of nonmediator experts can prove detrimental in chapter 9 cases.
Though somewhat different from Detroit’s bankruptcy, both cases relied on
extensive mediation. San Bernardino’s financial predicament did not attract
the attention of the outside philanthropic organizations that had flocked to
123. See Berman & Schneider, supra note 96 (noting that “the mediated settlements . . .
were one of the bankruptcy court’s key considerations in confirming the Plan” and that the
judge referred to the settlements in his findings that the plan was proposed in good faith, that
it did not discriminate unfairly, and that it was fair and equitable).
124. E.g., In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R at 221.
125. See Nathan Bomey et al., Judge OKs Bankruptcy Plan; a ‘Miraculous’ Outcome, Det.
Free Press (Nov. 7, 2014, 12:15 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/detroit-bank
ruptcy/2014/11/07/rhodes-bankruptcy-decision/18648093/ [https://perma.cc/REH7-Z2J3]
(noting that major financial creditors had argued “repeatedly during the case that the grand
bargain was illegal because it favored pensioners over other creditors”).
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Detroit.126 Furthermore, the state of California, unlike Michigan, does not
provide for an emergency manager or other state assistance in the event of a
municipal fiscal crisis.127 Although San Bernardino entered bankruptcy in
August of 2012, it did not confirm a plan until December of 2016, over four
years later.128
Despite these differences, San Bernardino and Detroit were similar in
that their plans of adjustment both depended on agreements the cities had
struck with their various creditors.129 In particular, San Bernardino’s pen-
sion bondholders achieved substantial agreement with the city prior to plan
confirmation, and their support of the city was crucial to the city’s issuance
of new debt.130
Like in Detroit, the judge in San Bernardino’s bankruptcy appointed a
colleague to oversee mediation efforts, and after thousands of hours of me-
diation, all impaired classes of creditors voted to accept the plan of adjust-
ment by wide margins, eliminating the need for San Bernardino to pursue a
cram down.131 Also like Judge Rhodes in the Detroit bankruptcy, Judge Jury
in San Bernardino acknowledged that these mediations had influenced her
application of the plan confirmation standards.132 In particular, Judge Jury
noted that “[t]he City’s almost completely successful effort to replace con-
frontation with consensus provides ample evidence for this Court to con-
clude that the Plan was proposed with honesty and good intentions, and in
good faith.”133 The settlement agreements that the city reached with its cred-
itors through mediation were also essential to the court’s decision that the
plan was in the best interests of creditors, as the alternative to confirming
the plan (dismissal) would result in the city “being flooded with litigation
from [these] creditors.”134
Just weeks prior to San Bernardino’s plan confirmation hearing, Judge
Jury continued to order city officials and creditors into mediation. Judge
Jury explained that if the parties could agree on a solution, the mediation
efforts would ultimately save time, in particular by preventing appeals.135
126. See Ryan Hagen, San Bernardino Bankruptcy Plan Gets Judge’s OK, Clearing Way for







131. Order Confirming Third Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of
San Bernardino, California (July 29, 2016), as Modified; Findings of Fact & Conclusions of
Law in Respect Thereof para. 15.5.3, In re City of San Bernardino, 566 B.R. 46 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 2017) (Case No. 6:12-bk-28006-MJ), ECF No. 2164.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. para. 18.1.4.
135. Ryan Hagen, San Bernardino Bankruptcy: Mediation, Then Final Confirmation Sched-
uled, San Bernardino Sun (Nov. 16, 2016, 3:10 AM), http://www.sbsun.com/government-
May 2018] Formalizing Chapter 9’s Experts 1271
Both city officials and creditors in San Bernardino’s bankruptcy proceeding
credited retired U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Gregg Zive’s mediation efforts as re-
sponsible for major settlements in the case, including with the city’s largest
creditor, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System.136
Because San Bernardino has only recently exited bankruptcy, it is diffi-
cult to assess how it has fared under its plan of adjustment. Nevertheless,
some indicators suggest that the city will continue to struggle. In 2017,
Moody’s issued a report suggesting that the city could file for bankruptcy
again due to operational challenges and public pension pressures.137 In fact,
Moody’s estimated that San Bernardino’s adjusted net pension liability will
remain at $904 million, significantly larger than the projected bankruptcy
savings of $350 million.138 In all, the Moody’s report suggested that although
San Bernardino’s plan of debt adjustment had some positive aspects, such as
increased revenues for the city, the larger picture—which includes pension
obligations and operational challenges—is much bleaker.139
In San Bernardino’s case, mediation proved invaluable to the city’s
bankruptcy exit. Although San Bernardino did not have quite as many re-
sources at its disposal as Detroit, mediation undoubtedly facilitated the
bankruptcy process and, in particular, shaped the judge’s application of the
plan confirmation standards. Missing from the bankruptcy process, how-
ever, were other experts, such as those who had so ably assisted the judge in
Detroit with assessing other plan requirements, like feasibility. Experts like
the ones who helped Judge Rhodes assess the overall fiscal health of Detroit
could have performed a similar role in San Bernardino and perhaps could
have identified or worked to alleviate some of the concerns expressed in the
Moody’s report. Notably, a feasibility expert may have been able to help
assess whether San Bernardino’s plan could overcome the pension-related
and operational challenges the city has continued to face since its bank-
ruptcy exit.
3. Stockton, California
Like Detroit and San Bernardino, Stockton reached extensive “com-




137. Frank Shafroth, Public Trust, Public Safety, & Municipal Fiscal Sustainability: Has the
Nation Experienced the Closing of Its Chapter on Municipal Bankruptcies?, GMU Mun. Sus-




139. Frank Shafroth, Disparate Fiscal Solvency Challenges, GMU Mun. Sustainability
Project (June 22, 2017), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2017/06/22/disparate-fiscal-
solvency-challenges/ [https://perma.cc/EVQ2-KLWU].
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oppose confirmation.140 At confirmation, the city’s good faith in proposing
the plan was the predominant issue, although other issues were ultimately
appealed to the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, including
whether the plan was in the best interests of creditors.141
The bankruptcy judge in Stockton, like his counterparts in Detroit and
San Bernardino, appointed another judge to serve as mediator in the case.142
Yet, even before Stockton entered bankruptcy, another process involving a
mediator proved helpful in avoiding litigation. As part of California’s bank-
ruptcy eligibility process, municipalities must engage in a “neutral evalua-
tion” with a mediator prior to filing for bankruptcy.143 During this prefiling
process, Stockton reached agreements to modify all of its unexpired collec-
tive bargaining agreements and made “substantial progress” on replacing its
expired police contract.144 Still, prebankruptcy mediation did not resolve all
of Stockton’s outstanding issues with its creditors, and Judge Klein warned
at the outset of the case that the city’s plan of adjustment would need to be
“consensual” in order for Stockton to succeed.145
During the bankruptcy itself, Stockton and its creditors engaged in “ex-
tensive mediation sessions with Bankruptcy Judge Elizabeth Perris” to re-
solve “outstanding labor issues” and reach “complex agreements” with all
but one capital markets creditor.146 Through these agreements, Stockton
regained the use of facilities that had been taken over by creditors, marking
an important step forward in attaining financial viability.147
In confirming Stockton’s plan of adjustment over a creditor objection,
the bankruptcy judge acknowledged the role the mediation had played, stat-
ing, “The myriad parties in interest . . . have agreed upon a consensual plan
of adjustment that reflects a complex balance achieved through many
months of exhaustive mediation.”148 The fact that one party had not reached
agreement with the city after extensive mediation, combined with the fact
that mediation efforts had been successful with all other parties, seemed to
play a role in the court’s decision to confirm Stockton’s plan over that
140. John T. Hansen, 3 Lessons from Stockton’s Bankruptcy, Law360 (Dec. 18, 2015, 4:25
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/738933/3-lessons-from-stockton-s-bankruptcy (on file
with the Michigan Law Review).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Alternatively, municipalities may declare a fiscal emergency if they feel they cannot
spare the time to comply with the mediation requirement. Cal. Gov’t Code § 53760 (West
2008).
144. In re City of Stockton, 526 B.R. 35, 61 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015).
145. Associated Press, Stockton Bankruptcy Judge Appoints Mediator, Orders Meeting, Mer-
cury News (Jul. 12, 2012, 12:48 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2012/07/12/stockton-
bankruptcy-judge-appoints-mediator-orders-meeting/ [https://perma.cc/CGW6-D3L8] (state-
ment of Judge Christopher Klein).
146. In re City of Stockton, 526 B.R. at 61.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 62.
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party’s objection, particularly with respect to the contentious good faith
issue.
Postbankruptcy, inflation and payroll slides have hampered Stockton’s
ability to provide basic services to its citizens.149 The city’s failure to match
wages from comparable cities has led to difficulties attracting workers to the
police and fire departments.150 Thus, while mediation played an important
role in Stockton’s bankruptcy, it was insufficient to ensure stability going
forward. Like in San Bernardino, the use of additional experts could have
proven valuable during the confirmation process for Stockton’s plan of ad-
justment in order to provide additional assurance that the plan could ad-
dress more long-term challenges.
4. Central Falls, Rhode Island
Central Falls’s bankruptcy was unique in many ways, although like De-
troit the state was heavily involved. In Central Falls’s case, the Rhode Island
legislature passed a law creating preferred status for certain bondholders,151
and the city entered state receivership the year before it filed for bank-
ruptcy.152 The state-appointed receiver, former Rhode Island Supreme Court
Justice Robert Flanders, led the city through the bankruptcy and ultimately
crafted a six-year postbankruptcy plan.153 Flanders is a “specialist in munici-
pal restructuring” and was appointed by the governor at the time, Lincoln
Chaffee.154 His knowledge of both municipal finance and the particularities
of Central Falls’s situation proved invaluable to Central Falls’s bankruptcy
experience—the city’s plan has been largely successful, with the city emerg-
ing from the plan in 2017.155
149. Roger Phillips, Stockton’s Post-Bankruptcy Recovery Still a Struggle, Recordnet.com
(Mar. 26, 2016, 4:00 PM), http://www.recordnet.com/news/20160326/stocktons-post-bank-
ruptcy-recovery-still-struggle [https://perma.cc/3JQB-AYJT].
150. Id.
151. See Pryor, supra note 29, at 107 (discussing the law).
152. Jess Bidgood, Plan to End Bankruptcy in Rhode Island City Gains Approval, N.Y.
Times (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/us/central-falls-ri-to-emerge-
from-bankruptcy.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
153. Frank Shafroth, The Art & Commitment of Municipal Fiscal Recovery, GMU Mun.
Sustainability Project (Apr. 11, 2017), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2017/04/11/
the-art-commitment-of-municipal-fiscal-recovery/ [https://perma.cc/5RDR-N24J].
154. The Pew Charitable Trs., The State Role in Local Government Financial
Distress 18 (2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2013/07/23/pew_state_role_in_
local_government_financial_distress.pdf [https://perma.cc/J73Z-556K].
155. See Jonathan Bissonnette, Upward Financial Trend Continues for Central Falls, Paw-
tucket Times (May 4, 2017), http://www.pawtuckettimes.com/news/upward-financial-trend-
continues-for-central-falls/article_da96b616-3071-11e7-af4d-7f22a19c1bb8.html [https://
perma.cc/Q2QV-K3DR] (reporting a statement by city officials asserting that “[t]he city has
had several years of strong budgetary performance, and has fully adhered to the established
post-bankruptcy plan”). Central Falls’s confirmation plan officially ended as of June 30, 2017.
See Order Confirming Fourth Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of City of Central
Falls, R.I. at 6, In re City of Central Falls, R.I., No. 11–13105–FJB (Bankr. D.R.I. Sept. 11,
2012), ECF No. 572.
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Central Falls’s bankruptcy experience demonstrates the value of having
a person—in this case, the receiver—involved who has specific expertise
about the municipality and what is possible for it. Prior to the bankruptcy,
Flanders had already closed Central Falls’s community center and library,
reduced retired city workers’ pensions, voided some contracts, and imposed
layoffs.156 Flanders worked with the community extensively prior to and dur-
ing the bankruptcy, allowing him to create a sustainable debt adjustment
plan.157 During the bankruptcy, Flanders also took the lead in negotiating
agreements with the city’s unions and retirees.158
Of course, the receiver’s involvement was not without its own
problems—one observer compared the receiver’s role in Central Falls’s af-
fairs to the German occupation of Paris.159 Furthermore, the state’s involve-
ment in creating legally preferred status for the bondholders undoubtedly
influenced negotiations during the city’s bankruptcy.160
Overall, Central Falls’ experience in bankruptcy illustrates the possibility
for increased state involvement in a bankruptcy to provide supplemental
expertise. The state-appointed receiver was instrumental in crafting the city’s
postbankruptcy plan, and his knowledge of the city’s position and predica-
ment, combined with his expertise in municipal finance, was essential to
creating a plan that would work. Although not all states will be as involved
as Rhode Island in their municipalities’ bankruptcies or fiscal affairs, Central
Falls’s case shows that allowing state and federal programs to work together
may provide lasting results.161
B. Themes and Concerns
Judges relied on mediators and other experts in these cases to help them
overcome limitations with chapter 9’s plan confirmation standards. In addi-
tion, these experts helped maximize bankruptcy’s core functions of breath-
ing space and nonconsensual debt adjustment. Judges regularly encouraged
parties to work with an independent neutral mediator to settle issues so that
they did not have to be resolved at plan confirmation. Additionally, the
judges in Detroit and Central Falls relied on experts familiar with the mu-
nicipality itself and with municipal finance more generally to provide them
156. Erika Niedowski, RI City’s Receiver Details 5-Year Recovery Plan, San Diego Union-





159. Bidgood, supra note 152 (statement of Lawrence Goldberg).
160. See Pryor, supra note 29, at 107.
161. See Coordes & Reilly, supra note 7, at 545 (affirming the desirability of state involve-
ment in municipal restructurings); Moringiello, supra note 30, at 462 (“It is in the states that
require no state involvement in a municipality’s decision to file for bankruptcy that the fear
that [c]hapter 9 will do nothing to remedy the conditions that led to a municipality’s financial
ills rings most true.”).
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with detailed, trusted information about the municipality and its plan of
adjustment.
Getting the parties to agree was key to plan confirmation in all four of
the above cases, so a critical role for any chapter 9 expert involves reducing
contention.162 The Bankruptcy Code does not provide specific procedures
for engaging in mediation or for chapter 9 judges to appoint outside ex-
perts.163 Nevertheless, most of the chapter 9 judges saw fit to simply appoint
a separate mediator, usually another judge that they knew, to facilitate this
process. By entrusting a mediator to oversee resolution of specific issues,
judges can ease the burden on themselves at plan confirmation. As one ex-
pert has observed, successful debt adjustment plans nearly always resolve all
significant issues with major creditors.164 Thus, mediation and its resulting
settlements are crucial to a smooth bankruptcy exit.
The cases also illustrate the role of the expert in conveying information
to the judge about the idiosyncrasies of the municipality at issue. Case
mediators became intimately familiar with the parties and the discrete issues
they were tasked with resolving. In addition, as seen in Detroit and Central
Falls, expertise can take on a larger role: experts familiar with the municipal-
ity’s financial problems can bring clarity and concreteness to the generalized
confirmation standards, allowing the judge to apply them more rigorously.
Experts in Detroit were particularly valuable when the judge determined
feasibility—whether the plan was likely to succeed on a going-forward basis.
As noted above, judges must make an objective evaluation of feasibility re-
gardless of whether creditors accept the plan.165 This objective evaluation
will be difficult, if not impossible, to perform in practice without substan-
tial, detailed information about the municipality’s unique situation and lim-
itations. Experts can help distill vast quantities of information down for the
judge, allowing him or her to gain this understanding more efficiently.
Thus, using experts in chapter 9 confers several benefits. First, experts
can alleviate the need for the judge to have to turn to precedent. As previ-
ously discussed, precedent is severely lacking for chapter 9 cases.166 Relying
on experts can give the judge a backstop and increase the judge’s confidence
that he or she is making the right decision. Second, experts can distill com-
plicated situations, laws, and relationships down for the judge, enabling the
judge to receive accurate information quickly. Third, although chapter 9, by
itself, is unlikely to ever fully rehabilitate municipalities, experts can help
strengthen chapter 9 for its limited purposes. In particular, mediation is
helpful with managing politically unpopular measures or bringing difficult
162. See Pryor, supra note 29, at 86 (describing bankruptcy as a process that drives the
parties to a settlement).
163. State laws may provide for these procedures in some cases. See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t
Code § 53760 (West 2008) (providing for a neutral evaluation process in California).
164. Shafroth, supra note 70 (citing chapter 9 proceedings in Detroit, Vallejo, Jefferson
County, and Stockton as examples).
165. See In re Mount Carbon Metro. Dist., 242 B.R. 18, 36 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1999).
166. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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or unwilling parties into the fold, a process critical to the functioning of the
bankruptcy system. In addition, experts help maximize the breathing room a
bankrupt municipality receives courtesy of the automatic stay by focusing on
a municipality’s key problems and working diligently to resolve them.
Although it is difficult to say for certain whether any of the municipali-
ties discussed above have “succeeded,” the plans that have seemed to work
thus far were produced using multiple types of experts. Broadly speaking,
the experts used in the cases can be classified into three types. First, expert
mediators, such as Judge Rosen in Detroit or Judge Zive in San Bernardino,
help to settle issues that would have otherwise been litigated and resolve
multiparty bargaining problems. Second, experts in municipal finance, such
as Judge Flanders in Central Falls or Martha Kopacz, Detroit’s feasibility
expert, help judges understand the minutiae of the municipality’s fiscal situ-
ation. Third, experts familiar with the community, such as Judge Flanders in
Central Falls, help break down the complexity of the municipality and pro-
vide an understanding of what is needed to move forward. All three types of
experts provide value to the case, and although expertise need not be cen-
tered in one person, one individual may be a source of multiple forms of
expertise, as Judge Flanders’ example in Rhode Island illustrates.
The cases also provide insights into some of the pitfalls that can occur
when using experts. For example, failure to define the scope of an expert’s
role, or allowing an expert, such as a receiver (in the case of Judge Flanders
in Central Falls) or emergency manager (in the case of Kevyn Orr in De-
troit), to make decisions relating to governance, can exacerbate tensions
with residents and provide fertile ground for creditor objections, slowing
down the bankruptcy process. In addition, not every municipality has the
resources to fund experts and mediators. Furthermore, to the extent that
mediation removes issues from the confirmation discussion, the municipal
bankruptcy process as a whole may suffer due to lack of a robust discussion
of the confirmation standards and their application. Finally, concerns may
arise with respect to who is appointing the experts and how the appoint-
ment process works.
This final point is of critical concern in a chapter 9 case because chapter
9 is already, in many ways, something of an antidemocratic process.167 The
appointment of an expert or mediator in a case may perhaps be viewed as an
opportunity to provide some democratic legitimacy to this process, as this
individual can serve as an intermediary between municipal officials, the
judge, and the municipality’s citizens. Yet, when a judge, as in Detroit, or a
government official, as in Central Falls, appoints a colleague or friend as an
expert without engaging in some sort of transparent selection process, this
opportunity for democratic legitimacy is threatened.168 This is especially true
167. See Gillette, supra note 69, at 1376 (“To the extent that the institutions of normal
politics are inadequate to redress . . . fiscal distress . . . an alternative decisionmaker less
responsive to normal politics may offer a solution.”).
168. See Martin, supra note 41, at 19 (comments of Kevyn Orr) (“[W]hen people feel their
fundamental covenants have not been met by their government, they may decide to resort to
violence.”).
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when the expert is given wide-ranging powers. For example, Judge Rosen,
the mediator in Detroit, was given broad authority to design settlements and
corral parties.169 While this authority may be desirable from a bankruptcy
perspective, in that it puts further pressure on parties to reach agreement, it
may be less desirable from the perspective of democratic legitimacy when an
appointee is seen as coercing decisions about a municipality’s future.
When a judge or a powerful official appoints an expert to a case, there is
also very little room for parties to the case to object to this appointment,
even if they feel that the case should proceed differently.170 Parties may also
feel uncomfortable working with an expert they know the judge is close to,
particularly if the judge is pressuring the parties to mediate, as nearly every
judge in the cases above did. A judge may appoint or rely on an expert in
order to pressure the parties to accept the deal the court wants to see. For
example, the judge in Stockton’s case urged the parties into mediation,
warning them that the plan needed to be consensual.171 Although the judge
likely desired a consensual plan because it would be easier to confirm, saying
that a plan must be consensual reflects a judge-made, rather than bank-
ruptcy-imposed, preference. Indeed, bankruptcy is valuable, in part, because
a debtor may choose not to reach a consensual plan, instead seeking to cram
down a plan over creditor objections.
Using an expert, the judge can exert this pressure without creating a
record where his or her comments can be used to challenge rulings.172 In
some cases, then, the expert can act as a surrogate for the judge, enhancing
the judge’s own power in the case.173 Thus, the current ad hoc methods of
appointing experts in chapter 9 may further weaken democracy and may
pressure the parties into reaching suboptimal arrangements. A formal pro-
cess for appointing and using experts can provide important checks and
balances on judicial behavior. These checks and balances may be particularly
important in the bankruptcy context, where the Supreme Court has ex-
pressed reluctance to give bankruptcy judges, who lack the life tenure and
salary protections of Article III judges, much discretion.174
In many ways, chapter 9 is a flawed system. Its design and structure lack
the flexibility needed to account for the diversity and breadth of debtor and
169. See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 168–71 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
170. See Jacoby, supra note 56, at 68, 81–83 (discussing how the Detroit bankruptcy court
used mediation, along with other procedural devices, to expand its role in the case).
171. Associated Press, supra note 145.
172. See Michelle Kaske & Steven Church, Puerto Rico Bondholders Seek Receivership for
Electric Company, 29 Bankr. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 818 (July 20, 2017) (describing how the
judge in Jefferson County’s bankruptcy put pressure on the county to settle by putting off
ruling on the bondholders’ request for receivership).
173. See Jacoby, supra note 56, at 81–82 (“By appointing a chief district judge as a media-
tor, the bankruptcy judge arguably delegates more power to the mediator than the bankruptcy
judge could have exercised himself.”).
174. See Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, Bankruptcy Step Zero, 2012 Sup. Ct. Rev.
203, 218 (discussing “a family of cases in which the Court has limited the domain over which
the bankruptcy judge may exercise her discretion”).
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creditor interests in the municipal context. Nevertheless, as the cases show,
courts have used mediation and expertise to help overcome these flaws. Thus
far, appointment of experts has been a largely informal process; mediators,
receivers, emergency managers, and other experts are not explicitly provided
for in the Bankruptcy Code. Use of these entities on an ad hoc basis, without
any procedures for vetting experts or defining their role, can raise concerns
about legitimacy and democracy. Yet, the cases to date have shown that there
is value in having specialized knowledge of municipalities and their financial
situations, as well as experienced negotiators to help maximize the use of the
bankruptcy toolkit in chapter 9.
Insufficient attention has been paid to the harms of ad hoc expert ap-
pointments. As the cases illustrate, experts can be some of the most powerful
parties in a bankruptcy case, in some cases even shaping critical pieces of the
plan. Indeed, an expert’s decisions can shape a municipality for years to
come.175 These experts should not be an afterthought. Rather, they should
be recognized for the important players that they are and given the attention
they deserve when it comes to defining their role in the case.
III. Using Experts in Chapter 9
This Part sets out guidelines for the creation of formal procedures for
the selection, appointment, and use of experts in chapter 9. Other areas of
bankruptcy law, outside of the municipal context, also use experts and can
provide guidance on best practices as well as pitfalls. After assessing these
areas, this Part advocates for the development of formal procedures with
respect to the use of experts in chapter 9, primarily in the form of a hearing
on this issue early in the case.
A. Experts in Insolvency Law
Although chapter 9 is somewhat unique in the bankruptcy field, chapter
9 judges are not alone in relying on experts for assistance, and the problems
of applying general standards to particularized facts are by no means unique
to municipal bankruptcy.176 This Section examines the role of expertise in
three other areas of bankruptcy law: other chapters of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code, sovereign debt restructuring, and Puerto Rico. Studying these areas
175. See supra Section II.A (describing Judge Rosen’s involvement in Detroit’s Grand Bar-
gain and Judge Flanders’s involvement in Central Falls’s postbankruptcy plan).
176. Expertise is also regularly used outside of the bankruptcy context, although analysis
of the use of experts outside of bankruptcy is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Mar-
garet A. Burt, The ICWA Expert Witness, Nat’l Child Welfare Resource Ctr. for Tribes
(2007), http://www.nrc4tribes.org/files/ICWA%20Expert%20Witness_Margaret%20Burt_
2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QST-YPSZ] (discussing the use and qualifications of expert wit-
nesses under the Indian Child Welfare Act); Randee Fenner, A River Runs Through It: Buzz
Thompson’s Stint As a Special Master, Stanford Law. (May 28, 2014), https://
law.stanford.edu/stanford-lawyer/articles/a-river-runs-through-it-buzz-thompsons-stint-as-a-
special-master/ [https://perma.cc/S4W4-MKBU] (describing the use of “special masters” to
collect evidence and provide information in interstate water disputes).
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provides guidance about possible ways to develop and formalize the use of
experts in chapter 9.
1. U.S. Bankruptcy Law
Formal roles for experts are present in nearly every other major area of
U.S. bankruptcy law. In other chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, an indepen-
dent U.S. Trustee provides oversight for the case and offers guidance to the
court and the parties about the way the case is proceeding.177 In a chapter 7
(liquidation) case, an impartial trustee is appointed to administer the case
and to liquidate assets.178 Similarly, in a chapter 13 (individual) case, a trus-
tee reviews and administers the proposed debt repayment plan.179 Even in a
chapter 11 case, where the debtor typically remains in control of the com-
pany being reorganized, the court may appoint a trustee or examiner if there
are concerns about the debtor in possession’s actions.180 Though rare, exam-
iners, which are neutral parties appointed to investigate and report on
claims and issues, have played important roles in some of the most complex
chapter 11 cases to date, including that of Lehman Brothers.181 Indeed, some
courts have allowed examiners to have quite expansive roles, including the
ability to monitor the debtor’s business or file a plan of reorganization.182
In other U.S. bankruptcy contexts, other entities, such as the U.S. Trus-
tee, bankruptcy trustees, and examiners, serve critical functions in keeping
the debtor on track. Although the U.S. Trustee is involved in chapter 9 cases,
the Trustee’s involvement is significantly attenuated compared even to a
chapter 11 case.183 Unlike in other chapters of the Code, the U.S. Trustee
does not examine the debtor during a meeting of creditors, cannot move to
appoint a trustee or examiner in the case, cannot move to convert the case,
does not supervise case administration, does not monitor the debtor’s finan-
cial operations, and does not review professional fees.184 Thus, relying on an
expert in chapter 9 can fill in some of the gaps left by the lack of a more
powerful trustee or judge.
177. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3) (2012).
178. Chapter 7—Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. Cts., http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/
bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-7-bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/857Z-KN6K].
179. Chapter 13—Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. Cts., http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/
bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-13-bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/XK68-JS8G].
180. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012).
181. Katherine Doorley, ABI Chapter 11 Reform Commission Series: Oversight of the Case
(Part I), Weil: Bankr. Blog (Jan. 8, 2015), https://business-finance-restructuring.weil.com/
abi-reform-commission/abi-chapter-11-reform-commission-series-recommendations-on-
oversight-of-the-case-part-i/ [https://perma.cc/5LSC-NJZZ].
182. Paula D. Hunt, Note, Bankruptcy Examiners Under Section 1104(b): Appointment and
Role in Complex Chapter 11 Reorganizations of Failed LBOs, 70 Wash. U. L.Q. 821, 841–44
(1992) (providing examples of cases where examiners have played expansive roles).
183. Chapter 9—Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. Cts., http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/
bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-9-bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/ZR3X-UZDU].
184. See id.
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Recent proposals for improving the U.S. bankruptcy system have also
reflected a desire for increased expertise.185 For example, the American
Bankruptcy Institute Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (the
“Commission”) has proposed using a flexible, court-appointed “estate neu-
tral” in chapter 11 cases.186 Under the proposed arrangement, the estate neu-
tral would have authority to advise the chapter 11 debtor in possession on
operational and financial matters, as well as on the content and negotiation
of its plan.187 The Commission especially recommended the estate neutral
for small businesses in chapter 11.188 The estate neutral would be chosen by
the U.S. Trustee and would be subject to court approval.189
The Commission’s proposal contemplates that the estate neutral would
represent the interests of the estate and would be paid with estate funds.190
The Commission has sought to ameliorate concerns about the cost of an
estate neutral by emphasizing that the appointment of an estate neutral
would not be mandatory.191 The Commission has also stressed the benefits
of an estate neutral, such as reducing the potential for diverging interests
and self-motivated actions by parties in a case.192 The proposed estate neu-
tral would thus serve several valuable functions akin to those that chapter 9
experts might serve, including clarifying the parties’ interests in a case and
bringing parties to the negotiating table. Furthermore, a chapter 9 expert
might perform a similar role to an estate neutral in the small business con-
text by, for example, providing financial advice tailored to the debtor.
The Commission recommended an estate neutral, in essence, to address
many of the same problems that arise in chapter 9 cases. The Commission’s
focus was on chapter 11, however, and its recommendation therefore ex-
tended only to chapter 11 cases.193 If the Commission is advocating for estate
neutrals in the chapter 11 context, it makes sense to have similar mecha-
nisms in place for municipalities given the need for judges in both municipal
and reorganization cases to apply the plan confirmation standards coher-
ently and consistently.
Other recent proposals have sought to incorporate more expertise into
the bankruptcy process. For example, Congress is currently considering a
185. See Michelle M. Harner, The Search for an Unbiased Fiduciary in Corporate Reorgani-
zations, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 469, 475 (2011) (discussing the benefits a third-party neutral
could bring to corporate reorganizations).
186. Comm’n to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, Am. Bankr. Inst., Final Report
and Recommendations 2012–2014, at 32–38 (2014) [hereinafter ABI Comm’n].
187. See id. at 294.
188. See id.
189. Doorley, supra note 181.
190. See ABI Comm’n, supra note 186, at 36–37.
191. See id. at 37.
192. Id.
193. See id. at 4.
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bill “that would create a new bankruptcy process for large financial institu-
tions.”194 The bill contemplates that bankruptcy cases for these entities
“would be assigned to a bankruptcy judge picked from a pre-selected pool of
judges chosen for their experience, ability and willingness to handle such
challenging, fast-paced cases.”195 Congress has thus recognized the value of
expertise in dealing with complex entities whose financial difficulties can
have far-reaching impacts. Like financial institutions, municipalities are
complicated, multifaceted entities whose distress can create ripple effects ex-
tending well beyond the distressed entity itself.196
Virtually every other major aspect of U.S. bankruptcy law uses some
form of expert, and recent proposals indicate a desire to incorporate even
more expertise into the process. In chapter 9, however, no formal mecha-
nisms for the selection and use of experts exist, and no proposals to date
have sought to establish a formal avenue or role for these parties. Chapter 9,
which deals with some of the most important entities in society, needs these
formal mechanisms at least as much as other areas of U.S. bankruptcy law.
2. Sovereign Debt
A possible reason for the lack of a formal expert system in chapter 9
may lie in concerns that granting powers to such a party might encroach too
much on state sovereignty over municipalities. The current iteration of
chapter 9 was carefully designed to limit concerns that the federal govern-
ment was interfering with municipalities’ contractual obligations, thereby
preventing them from overseeing their own financial affairs.197 However,
looking beyond the United States to the sovereign debt context reveals that
these concerns may be overcome.
Several years ago, the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) proposed a
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (“SDRM”) to better address
problems with government debt.198 As part of this mechanism, the IMF en-
visioned an efficient, impartial dispute resolution process run by an inde-
pendent and centralized forum.199 The forum would decide challenges




196. Pengjie Gao et al., Municipal Borrowing Costs and State Policies for Distressed Munici-
palities, SSRN 29 (May 20, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2845
515 [https://perma.cc/TQ7Z-P6NF] (discussing concerns about negative externalities associ-
ated with municipal defaults).
197. See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 47–48, 51 (1938) (upholding amended ver-
sion of chapter 9, which limited the power of the bankruptcy court); Ashton v. Cameron Cty.
Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 530–31 (1936) (expressing these concerns
about the initial version of chapter 9).
198. See Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 Geo.
J. Int’l L. 299, 300–01 (2005).
199. Id. at 382; IMF, Proposed Features of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mech-
anism 23 (2003), reprinted in id. app. at 395.
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brought by parties in interest and perform important administrative func-
tions, but would not resolve economic or political issues.200 Although the
forum would act in some ways like a municipal bankruptcy judge, the forum
itself would consist of a panel of judges with carefully prescribed roles.201
Specifically, the forum’s responsibilities would be limited to performing ad-
ministrative tasks, facilitating dispute resolution, and enjoining specific en-
forcement actions at the debtor’s request.202 The forum would not be able to
challenge decisions made by the IMF nor decide issues relating to sovereign
debt sustainability.203
To address concerns over encroachment on state sovereignty and to allay
fears about certain parties exercising undue influence over the forum, the
IMF’s proposal included detailed guidance on how the members of the fo-
rum would be selected.204 Under the proposal, a permanent pool of judges
would be chosen in advance to serve on the forum, and a panel would be
created from the pool when a crisis arose.205 In this way, the judges would be
less likely to be swayed by any particular agenda from the IMF, while also
being available quickly in the event of a crisis.206 Judges would continue to
work in their own countries and in their own capacities until they were
impaneled.207 To further avoid any concern about undue influence from the
IMF, parties outside the IMF would play a role in the selection process,
including professional associations of corporate insolvency and debt-restruc-
turing experts.208
Although the IMF’s SDRM has not come to fruition, it is instructive as a
parallel to chapter 9 proceedings because of the attention the IMF has paid
to procedures for selecting and appointing experts as well as cabining their
roles to avoid political issues. Just as in municipal bankruptcy, adjudicators
in the sovereign debt context walk a fine line when it comes to the powers
they can exercise. Countries, much like U.S. states, are wary of procedures
that encroach upon their sovereign powers. Thus, the selection process for
the forum is instructive in thinking about appointment and selection of ex-
perts in chapter 9.
200. Hagan, supra note 198, at 383–84.
201. See id. at 343 n.114, 346, 388–89 (“The need to fashion a relatively minimalist frame-
work was also dictated by the immovable reality of state sovereignty.”).
202. IMF, Proposed Features of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 28
(2003), reprinted in id. app. at 401–02.
203. Id. app. at 401.
204. Hagan, supra note 198, at 387–88. In addition to these measures, the entire SDRM
process could only be activated upon the debtor’s initiative. IMF, Proposed Features of a
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 28 (2003), reprinted in id. app. at 397.
205. Hagan, supra 198, at 387–88.
206. Id. at 388.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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3. Puerto Rico
Puerto Rico’s fiscal struggles are well documented and well publicized.
Although Puerto Rico was deemed ineligible for chapter 9 bankruptcy, Con-
gress created the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stabil-
ity Act (“PROMESA”) in 2016 to help the U.S. territory with its financial
issues.209 PROMESA established an oversight board, composed of a group of
experts, to guide the territory in managing its finances.210 President Obama
appointed the oversight board’s seven members based on Congress’s
recommendations.211
The PROMESA oversight board has extensive powers, and in this re-
spect, Puerto Rico’s situation differs in a key way from that of U.S. munici-
palities.212 PROMESA gives the oversight board absolute power over the
territory’s elected officials and finances, reflecting an unprecedented author-
ity to govern.213 Many Puerto Ricans feel that the oversight board, which
directs the Commonwealth’s finances and insolvency proceedings, is too
powerful.214 The Oversight Board’s actions have been controversial,215 and
some commentators believe they have resulted in “more fiscal harm than
good.”216 Recently, the judge in Puerto Rico’s Title III proceedings even re-
jected the board’s proposal to appoint agents to advocate for dueling credi-
tors in debt-restructuring talks, lending credence to creditors’ claims that
the board, which would have had a hand in appointing the agents, could not
209. Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 114-
187, 130 Stat. 549 (2016) (to be codified at 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2241).
210. Id. § 101, 130 Stat. at 553–57.
211. Doyle, supra note 20. The governor of Puerto Rico also had one appointee on the
board to represent his positions. Rebecca Spalding, Puerto Rico Governor’s Appointee on Over-
sight Board Steps Down, 29 Bankr. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at 10 (July 20, 2017).
212. But see Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a
Problem, 27 Yale J. on Reg. 351, 385 (2010) (advocating for state oversight boards as an
alternative to chapter 9).
213. Frank Shafroth, Governance & Fiscal Recovery, GMU Mun. Sustainability Project
(Apr. 3, 2017), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2017/04/03/governance-fiscal-recovery/
[https://perma.cc/2LJY-M643].
214. See Mitu Gulati & Robert K. Rasmussen, Puerto Rico and the Netherworld of Sovereign
Debt Restructuring, in Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 17–11, at 2 (Ctr. for Law &
Soc. Sci., Research Paper Series No. CLASS17–13, 2017); Susan Cornwell & Nick Brown, Pu-
erto Rico Oversight Board Appointed, Reuters (Aug. 31, 2016, 12:12PM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-puertorico-debt-board/puerto-rico-oversight-board-appointed-
idUSKCN11628X [https://perma.cc/79A4-NEQQ].
215. See, e.g., Shafroth, supra note 121 (describing the fallout, including student strikes,
from the Oversight Board’s demands for cuts at the University of Puerto Rico).
216. Frank Shafroth, Is There a PROMESA of Recovery?, GMU Mun. Sustainability
Project (May 5, 2017), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2017/05/05/is-there-a-
promesa-of-recovery/ [https://perma.cc/YJ5R-T2Q6].
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be objective.217 Puerto Rico represents perhaps the outer limits of an expert’s
influence in the insolvency context.
Expertise will likely continue to play a significant role in resolving Pu-
erto Rico’s fiscal distress as the territory proceeds with the in-court restruc-
turing process known as Title III. Although Title III is similar to chapter 9 in
many ways, it is a distinct law, and the court overseeing the process will be
navigating uncharted waters. In particular, PROMESA’s structure raises the
potential for tension between the oversight board and the Title III court in
deciding whether plan confirmation requirements have been satisfied.218
“[T]he oversight board’s certification of a fiscal plan is nonreviewable.”219
Yet, PROMESA also requires the Title III court to determine that the plan of
adjustment is consistent with the oversight board’s fiscal plan,220 “creat[ing]
tension with the nonreviewability of the oversight board’s certification, and
provid[ing] grounds for litigation for creditors . . . .”221 Concerns about
encroachment of power are particularly high given that “the oversight
board’s certifications are not subject to a notice and comment procedure,”
and the board’s members are not confirmed by the Puerto Rico
legislature.222
Both the Puerto Rican government and the PROMESA oversight board
will have roles in the Title III process. While both the government and the
board are likely seeking fiscal recovery, they are unlikely to have similar pro-
posals to achieve this end, setting the stage for a potential clash of interests
217. Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Judge Nixes Negotiation Plan in Debt Battle, Reuters (June
28, 2017, 11:20 AM), http://in.reuters.com/article/us-puertorico-debt-bankruptcy/puerto-rico-
judge-nixes-negotiation-plan-in-debt-battle-idINKBN19J234 [https://perma.cc/5NEY-PBVY].
218. Richard J. Cooper et al., Issues to Expect in a Title III Puerto Rico Restructuring,
Law360 (Mar. 8, 2017, 11:07 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/898663/issues-to-expect-
in-a-title-iii-puerto-rico-restructuring (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
219. Id.
220. Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 114-
187, 130 Stat. 583–84 (2016) (to be codified at 48 U.S.C. § 2174).
221. Cooper, supra note 218.
222. Id.
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and confusion over who has the final say in the territory’s fiscal govern-
ance.223 This confusion and tension is particularly problematic because Pu-
erto Rico’s fiscal distress has a direct effect on its citizens’ welfare.224
Mediation has also played a role in resolving Puerto Rico’s fiscal distress.
Former bankruptcy judge Allan Gropper served as a mediator in debt-re-
structuring talks between the Commonwealth’s general obligation bond-
holders and holders of its COFINA debt, which is backed by sales tax
revenue.225 Shortly after Puerto Rico filed for its bankruptcy proceedings, its
main creditors expressed an interest in continuing mediation settlement
talks to resolve the unpayable debt.226 The judge overseeing the Title III pro-
cess appointed several other judges as mediators in the case.227 In fact, even
the mediation team is seeking to appoint their own expert in the form of an
outside financial consultant.228
In all, Puerto Rico is an extreme example of a very powerful set of ex-
perts. Puerto Rico is also somewhat of a cautionary tale. While the island’s
situation demonstrates the benefits expertise can bring to the table, it also
223. Frank Shafroth, The Hard Road to Fiscal Sustainability, GMU Mun. Sustainability
Project (June 2, 2017), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2017/06/02/the-hard-road-to-
fiscal-sustainability/ [https://perma.cc/X5TA-9TBU] (describing the budget conflicts—both
current and potential—among Puerto Rico’s government, the oversight board, and the judge
overseeing the bankruptcy process); Frank Shafroth, The Knife Edges of Municipal Bankruptcy,
GMU Mun. Sustainability Project (May 12, 2017), https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress
.com/2017/05/12/the-knife-edges-of-municipal-bankruptcy/ [https://perma.cc/8QPN-N8C8].
Some of these interest clashes have also caused tensions between the oversight board and
Congress. See Frank Shafroth, Is There a “Right” Structure to Resolve Fiscal Insolvency?, GMU
Mun. Sustainability Project (June 19, 2017) [hereinafter Shafroth, “Right” Structure],
https://fiscalbankruptcy.wordpress.com/2017/06/19/is-there-a-right-structure-to-resolve-fis-
cal-insolvency/ [https://perma.cc/3CWX-4TPV] (statement of House Natural Resources Com-
mittee Chairman Rob Bishop) (“The oversight board’s dilatory tactics run counter to the plain
language of PROMESA.”).
224. See, e.g., Associated Press, Puerto Rico Grapples with Foreclosure Crisis as Thousands
Lose Homes, NBC News (June 21, 2017, 8:55 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/
puerto-rico-grapples-foreclosure-crisis-thousands-lose-homes-n775021 [https://perma.cc/
S7FC-DPBE] (discussing the link between Puerto Rico’s foreclosure crisis and its “underlying
weak economy” and noting that the foreclosure crisis is harder to resolve because it is tied to
the economy as a whole rather than individual bad loans).
225. Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Board Schedules Mediation in Key Creditor Dispute, Reuters
(Mar. 31, 2017, 11:11 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/puertorico-debt-mediation/puerto
-rico-board-schedules-mediation-in-key-creditor-dispute-idUSL2N1H8106 [https://perma.cc/
4R6Y-5WM3].
226. Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Creditors Open to Mediation in Bankruptcy Court, Reuters
(May 17, 2017, 1:25 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-puertorico-debt-hearing/puerto-
rico-creditors-open-to-mediation-in-bankruptcy-court-idUSKCN18D0D9 [https://perma.cc/
R52Y-7YWH].
227. Associated Press, Mediation Team Created for Puerto Rico Bankruptcy Cases, Fox Bus.
(Jun. 14, 2017), http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2017/06/14/mediation-team-created-
for-puerto-rico-bankruptcy-cases.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (noting that
five federal judges, including a bankruptcy court judge, have been appointed to the mediation
team); Shafroth, “Right” Structure, supra note 223.
228. Michelle Kaske, Puerto Rico’s Mediator Is Said to Seek Outside Financial Adviser,
Bankr. L. Rep. (BNA) (July 20, 2017) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
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highlights the dangers and tensions that can arise when experts are given
expansive roles or are perceived as overstepping their bounds. Indeed, in
August of 2017, Aurelius Capital, a hedge fund, brought suit in federal court,
arguing that the oversight board was unconstitutionally established because
its members had been “handpicked by individual members of Congress”
without confirmation proceedings.229 Puerto Rico thus serves as an example
of the tensions that can arise when powerful experts are appointed without
defined procedures.
* * *
Insolvency proceedings around the world reflect a belief that specialized
expertise encourages flexible, creative approaches to addressing complex and
unique problems. Chapter 9 is no different. Yet, as Puerto Rico’s situation
illustrates, it is important to define and limit the scope of the expert’s role.
Open, transparent procedures for selecting and appointing experts may
avoid some of the problems the territory has faced with respect to the over-
sight board’s acceptance by residents and the local government. The follow-
ing Section explores how experts might be selected and used in chapter 9, as
well as the benefits and drawbacks of formalizing the expert’s appointment
and role in a chapter 9 case.
B. The Expert in Chapter 9
With some legislative adjustments, formal procedures for selecting and
appointing experts could become a part of chapter 9 cases. Through these
procedures, all parties to a case will understand the scope and limitations of
the expert’s role.
1. Procedures and Role
As discussed, judges are already using mediators and other experts in
bankruptcy, and this trend is likely to continue. Yet, judges currently select
these experts on an ad hoc basis, with little to no public process or room for
discussion. This ad hoc use of experts can result in appointment of an indi-
vidual with an ill-defined set of duties and may result in the expert interfer-
ing with the municipality’s governance procedures. Additionally,
municipalities that do not expect the judge to appoint an expert may have
trouble funding these entities and their work on the case. All of these
problems can be resolved through the development of procedures with re-
spect to experts.
Flexibility in procedures with respect to an expert’s appointment, selec-
tion, and role is likely necessary, as each crisis and each municipality is dif-
ferent. The type(s) of expertise needed and the individual(s) best suited to
229. Mary Williams Walsh, Hedge Fund Sues to Have Puerto Rico’s Bankruptcy Case
Thrown Out, N.Y. Times (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/07/business/
dealbook/puerto-rico-debt-oversight-board.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
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provide that expertise will therefore differ from case to case. Nevertheless,
careful thought should be given to whether expertise in mediation, munici-
pal finance, or the particular community will be necessary for a case. Pro-
posals and practices across the insolvency spectrum can provide guidance
for promoting “transparency, accountability, and predictability” with re-
spect to these experts.230
Although chapter 9 is federal law, the formal procedures for determin-
ing the selection and scope of chapter 9 experts will also entail involvement
from the states. Because chapter 9 requires that states specifically authorize
their municipalities to enter bankruptcy,231 Congress could amend the chap-
ter 9 eligibility rules to require that states adopt procedures for the selection
of chapter 9 experts when they provide authorization. Much as states have
adopted legislation in response to chapter 9’s requirement of specific state
authorization, the individual states could then incorporate specific proce-
dures for the selection process into their relevant authorizing statutes, as
well as define the outer limits of the roles experts could play in bankruptcy
proceedings.
States could draw upon aspects of the IMF’s procedure for selecting
members of its proposed dispute resolution forum, described above, to
avoid concerns about more powerful parties appointing and subsequently
influencing experts in chapter 9. When the IMF designed its procedures, its
officials tried to ensure that no one entity would have outsize influence over
the selection process, including the IMF.232 Similarly, it will be important for
states to establish selection and appointment procedures for chapter 9 ex-
perts that do not give too much weight to any one entity or individual.
Applying the IMF’s procedures to develop chapter 9 processes might
involve state officials working with local bankruptcy professional organiza-
tions to identify and establish a pool of vetted experts available to serve in
various regions across the state. Experts selected for the pool would be
tasked with maintaining knowledge of the municipalities in their region, in-
cluding their debt issuances, credit ratings, and the legal, financial, and his-
toric frameworks in which they operate. Once a municipality chooses to
commence a chapter 9 case, the bankruptcy judge could, with the consent of
the municipality, appoint one or more experts from the pool to serve on the
case. The number of experts to appoint in each case would depend on sev-
eral factors, including cost, the complexity of the municipality’s finances,
and the relationship between the municipality and its creditors.
Regardless of the state’s particular selection process, the critical task will
be to assemble a pool of experts with extensive familiarity with the three
230. See Marc J. Heimowitz, Government as Rescue Financier: Not Just a Private Lender, 19
U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 49, 98 (2016) (noting that “rules of general application can be constructed in
light of noncontroversial goals such as transparency, accountability, and predictability” in the
context of government bailouts).
231. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012) (“An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 . . . if such
entity . . . is specifically authorized . . . to be a debtor under such chapter by State law . . . .”).
232. See supra notes 204–208 and accompanying text.
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areas described in Part II: mediation, municipal bankruptcy and finance,
and the municipality itself. Like the IMF’s proposed procedures, multiple
parties should also be involved in the selection process, including—as sug-
gested here—professional organizations. If feasible, getting input from the
community through town halls or other types of open forums may be desir-
able as part of the selection process in order to reduce the potential for
community pushback if and when an expert is eventually appointed in a
case.
Although assembling a pool of experts would likely be resource inten-
sive, the task is not as daunting as it perhaps first appears. Indeed, proce-
dures for mediator selection are quite common in other contexts. For
example, many courts already have well-established local rules on mediation
as well as precertified panels of mediators, so there is some precedent for
assembling a pool of experts prior to a case commencing.233 Depending on
the state legislation introduced, distressed municipalities could also draw on
the pool of experts to assist them prior to filing for bankruptcy. To the ex-
tent that states use prebankruptcy planning, oversight, and intervention
methods, as many do, experts could play a valuable role in these processes as
well.
During the bankruptcy itself, the expert would play a role further de-
fined at the outset of the case. Congress should modify the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure to provide procedures for the bankruptcy judge to
appoint experts in the case. In particular, the judge should hear from state
and local officials, residents, and the U.S. Trustee on the role of experts in
the case. Ideally, these procedures would take place early in the case, perhaps
during the hearing on municipal eligibility. Although the outer limits of the
expert’s ability would be prescribed by the state, there should be leeway for
the judge to consider specific roles for the expert, including overseeing nego-
tiations, mediating, convening voters and residents, investigating discrete as-
pects of the case and proposed plan of adjustment, and providing
information to the judge based on any investigation(s) conducted.
At the eligibility hearing, the bankruptcy judge could review proposals
from the parties and the U.S. Trustee on which experts from the pool to
appoint, how many are needed, and why each party feels an expert is neces-
sary. In this way, although the appointment of the expert and scope of the
expert’s role would be ultimately specified by the bankruptcy judge, such
determination would take place after a hearing on the issues where multiple
parties could be heard. The judge’s involvement in the appointment of the
expert is important because experts need an ability to be heard in court, as
well as the requisite authority to conduct an investigation if one is desired.
The addition of a hearing on the experts would also give all parties in the
case room to articulate what they believe is necessary for the case as well as
who is best qualified to serve. Agreeing upon and setting parameters on the
233. See, e.g., Alternative Dispute Resolution Mediation, U.S. Bankr. Ct. Dist. Ariz., http:/
/www.azb.uscourts.gov/alternative-dispute-resolution-mediation [https://perma.cc/TCE4-
9DWF] (listing approved mediators).
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expert’s authority at the outset of the case is important, both so that the
expert knows when he or she has the freedom to act and so that the judge or
other parties can cabin the expert from overstepping his or her role.
Although the expert’s role would be subject to some variation depend-
ing on the exact needs of each case, previous chapter 9 cases can provide
guidance to states on best practices for the use of experts. As discussed pre-
viously, experts are primarily valuable for their roles in facilitating settle-
ments and providing information about the municipality, municipal
bankruptcy, and municipal finance to the judge so that he or she can make
an informed decision regarding plan confirmation. Thus, experts should be
used to facilitate settlement proceedings, to help draft the municipality’s
plan of adjustment by providing both technical, financial expertise and local
knowledge, and to investigate particular issues with respect to the debtor or
its finances that arise in the case.
In addition to specifying appropriate roles for experts in chapter 9, state
legislation should also impose limitations on these experts. In particular,
experts should not assume official capacities within the government that
they are assisting. Appointing a chapter 9 expert to a formal role in munici-
pal government may be viewed by residents and officials alike as an en-
croachment on democracy and may create tensions with residents similar to
those seen in Detroit and Puerto Rico.234 This legislation, by leaving govern-
ance matters and final decisionmaking authority with elected municipal offi-
cials, could help mitigate tensions among these officials, municipal residents,
and the expert and could serve as an important check on the expert’s power.
Experts would come with a cost, but the question of who pays for the
expert has several possible resolutions. As discussed, states could incorporate
a requirement for municipalities to consider engaging the services of one or
more experts as part of the authorization process for chapter 9. In the same
vein, states could also offer to defray the cost of any experts actually used. At
the hearing to approve the expert, the parties could ask the judge to set caps
on the expert’s fees. Alternatively, states could choose to cabin use of an
expert to only certain cases. For example, states may choose to require ex-
pertise only in larger (more populous) municipal bankruptcies, where more
complications are likely to arise; in cases involving general purpose munici-
palities, such as cities and towns; or in cases with municipalities with a cer-
tain amount of debt. States may also decide that whether an expert is used in
a particular case is best decided on an individualized basis.
Because municipal distress’s ripple effects can even affect the federal
government, it is possible that Congress could establish a fund to help defray
the cost of an expert, similar to the existing fund Congress has created for
234. Cf. Nick Brown & Daniel Bases, Puerto Rico’s Major Bondholders Critical of Fiscal
Turnaround Plan, Reuters (Mar. 28, 2017, 9:26 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-puer
torico-debt/puerto-ricos-major-bondholders-critical-of-fiscal-turnaround-plan-idUSKBN16Z
1OP [https://perma.cc/GW73-GXYB] (describing how Puerto Rico’s major bondholders are
critical of the oversight board–approved fiscal turnaround plan).
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the U.S. Trustee Program.235 Finally, similar to professional fees in bank-
ruptcy, an expert’s fees should be subject to judicial approval.236 If possible,
funding the expert from a combination of sources may be the most desira-
ble, as such an arrangement would give the expert financial independence
from any one entity.
Despite the expert’s price tag, using an expert could ultimately be a
source of cost savings for the municipality. For example, the expert may
expedite the plan confirmation process through dispute resolution, similar
to the way the mediator in Detroit played a key role in helping the city exit
bankruptcy in record time for a city of Detroit’s size. As discussed above,
mediators in chapter 9 often help resolve issues that would otherwise be
litigated, thus saving the municipality time and money in drawn-out court
proceedings. Additionally, by relaying more in-depth information to the
bankruptcy judge, the expert could provide greater assurance that a munici-
pality’s proposed plan will work as intended, making it less likely that the
municipality will need to enter bankruptcy again.
2. Benefits of Formalization
Although it is possible, and even desirable, to use experts outside of the
chapter 9 process,237 there are distinct benefits to incorporating the expert
into the bankruptcy process itself. Notably, mediation efforts may be more
likely to succeed in bankruptcy, as the judge’s ability to cram down a plan—
or dismiss the case—creates well-documented incentives for parties to strike
a bargain.238 Experts can assist with this process by facilitating greater coor-
dination, information exchange, and overall dialogue within the case, pro-
viding a measure of security for creditors who fear inequitable treatment by
debtors in bankruptcy.239 Additionally, as illustrated above, experts can help
the judge apply the confirmation requirements to the municipality’s plan of
adjustment. An expert knowledgeable about the municipality’s idiosyncra-
sies can provide guidance to the judge with respect to how to apply the
235. About the Program, U.S. Dept. of Just. (May 12, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/ust/
about-program [https://perma.cc/PEV4-UDHV] (“[T]he program is funded by the United
States Trustee System Fund, which consists primarily of fees paid by parties and businesses
invoking Federal bankruptcy protection.”).
236. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 327, 328 (2012).
237. Indeed, some states already employ a form of expertise outside of the chapter 9 con-
text. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 53760 (West 2008); see also Frank Shafroth, Addressing Municipal
Fiscal Distress, GMU Mun. Sustainability Project (Apr. 5, 2017), https://fiscalbankruptcy.
wordpress.com/2017/04/05/addressing-municipal-fiscal-distress/ [https://perma.cc/HKY7-8
PGA] (describing a proposal for a similar program in Illinois).
238. See, e.g., Pryor, supra note 29, at 122 (noting that bankruptcy “drives stakeholders to
compromise or face dismissal”).
239. See Hagan, supra note 198, at 310 (discussing “pronounced” creditor coordination
problems as debt instruments become more complex).
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general confirmation standards to the particular debtor. Experts may be es-
pecially valuable with respect to the feasibility determination, which is often
highly technical and fact based.240
Although states are free to use expertise outside of the bankruptcy con-
text,241 having an expert involved in the chapter 9 process may take some
pressure off of the state to devise its own full-fledged relief program.242 Thus,
experts in chapter 9 may be particularly valuable for states that are facing
their own financial struggles and do not have the resources to provide robust
financial oversight mechanisms for their municipalities outside of
bankruptcy.
In bankruptcy, experts will fulfill a role distinct from that of the bank-
ruptcy judge. Although judges do have bankruptcy expertise, they may be
less familiar with the particularities of the debtor municipality and its fiscal
and operating constraints. The expert, who will have greater specialized
competency in the municipality’s specific issues, can provide this informa-
tion to the judge. Additionally, while a bankruptcy judge has a full slate of
cases on the docket, experts would be involved in only one case at a time.
Scholars have observed that courts, despite their bankruptcy expertise, lack
the resources, time, and specialized knowledge necessary to perform many
oversight functions.243 Having a trusted expert available who understands
the municipality and the problems it is experiencing will greatly benefit the
bankruptcy case while relieving bankruptcy judges of some pressure.244
Experts will also fulfill a role distinct from that of the U.S. Trustee. Al-
though increasing the U.S. Trustee’s role in a chapter 9 case in lieu of ap-
pointing an expert would eliminate the need to design a selection process,
U.S. Trustees, like bankruptcy judges, are likely to lack expertise about a
given municipality. To return to the example of Judge Flanders’s role in Cen-
tral Falls’ bankruptcy, multiple forms of expertise are often needed in a
240. See, e.g., In re Jennifer Convertibles, Inc., 447 B.R. 713, 725 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(finding plan to be feasible when debtor’s monthly operating report showed strong and consis-
tent growth); In re General Electrodynamics Corp., 368 B.R. 543, 555–56 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2007) (finding plan to be feasible when debtor had demonstrated access to cash infusions); In
re Rivers End Apartments, Ltd., 167 B.R. 470, 476–77 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994) (finding plan to
be feasible when debtor’s anticipated future economic growth was backed by fact and expert
testimony).
241. For example, the Illinois legislature is considering a bill to establish an authority to
address local government financial distress. See Shafroth, supra note 237.
242. See, e.g., Kimhi, supra note 212, at 385 (arguing for state assistance in the form of
special boards); Parikh & He, supra note 7, at 603 (discussing proposal that states adopt a debt
adjustment mechanism).
243. Jennifer Payne, The Role of the Court in Debt Restructuring, SSRN 11–12 (Jan. 20,
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2902528 [https://perma.cc/4HDH-RGMG].
244. See Stefano Rossi & Hayong Yun, What Drives Financial Reform? Economics and Polit-
ics of the State-Level Adoption of Municipal Bankruptcy Laws, SSRN 34 (Dec. 4, 2015), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2698665 [https://perma.cc/4GHD-UDJB] (“[Fi-
nancial reforms] are significantly shaped . . . by the efficiency of courts . . . . [E]nabling courts
to enforce the complex legislation of financial markets is one of the main challenges of
globalization.”).
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chapter 9 case. Judge Flanders had expertise about bankruptcy and munici-
pal restructuring, as well as expertise about the particular municipal debtor.
Judge Flanders was thus able to devise a working plan of adjustment for
Central Falls not just because of his experience with municipal bankruptcy,
but also because of his familiarity with the city. Furthermore, although both
U.S. Trustees and judges have extensive bankruptcy expertise, neither of
these entities are likely to have seen many chapter 9 cases in their careers. An
expert with experience in the municipal restructuring process can thus be
very valuable.
Above all, experts can help tailor the generalized bankruptcy process to
more effectively address debtors’ individualized problems. In chapter 9, they
can help to ensure that municipalities are getting the most out of the process
and are using bankruptcy’s toolkit in a way that will work for them. Formal-
izing the selection and role of experts will add an element of trustworthiness
and allow these important individuals to perform their roles more
effectively.
Notably, depending on the needs of the case and the requests of the
parties, the judge may find it beneficial to appoint several individuals to
fulfill the expert role or to assign specific tasks to separate individuals. The
key difference from the status quo in chapter 9 is that these decisions will be
made after a process has taken place, one that involves the state, residents,
and parties to the case, rather than merely the judge.
Subjecting experts to a rigorous selection and approval process legiti-
mates the expert and may reduce challenges to the expert’s credibility during
the bankruptcy, such as those seen in Detroit. Additionally, articulating the
role and scope of the expert’s functions within the bankruptcy allows parties
to understand this role and even to have a say in defining desired limita-
tions. Furthermore, providing a clear role for an expert in chapter 9 may
encourage municipalities who need bankruptcy relief to enter the process
sooner rather than engage in potentially costly, harmful delay tactics.245 This
is because the expert may provide more certainty about what the municipal-
ity can expect in chapter 9. Creditors, for their part, might be reassured that
an expert is present to help protect their rights. Increased certainty can be
beneficial in the borrowing context, so it is also possible that municipalities
who rely on experts in bankruptcy will be able to reenter the debt markets
more quickly than if they had not.246 Formal procedures can also assist in
speeding up a bankruptcy case, as preselected, vetted experts would be avail-
able and ready to assist with a case as soon as it is filed. Having a system in
245. See Desmond Lachman, Time Is of the Essence: Puerto Rico Needs Bankruptcy Protec-
tion. Now., The Hill (Apr. 27, 2017, 12:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/econ-
omy-budget/330840-time-is-of-the-essence-puerto-rico-needs-bankruptcy [https://perma.cc/
UC2Y-73Z4] (puzzling over “why Puerto Rico’s governor and its Oversight Board have not
already availed themselves of . . . bankruptcy” and noting that “[b]y orderly restructuring its
debt, the island would reduce the investor uncertainty from which it now suffers as a result of
a debt level that everyone knows it cannot afford to pay”).
246. See Parikh & He, supra note 7, at 629–30 (discussing certainty in the underwriting
process).
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place for chapter 9’s experts will reduce the cost and time necessary to seek
out an expert once a case begins.
Recent chapter 9 cases demonstrate the importance of the expert’s per-
ceived legitimacy. Formal, transparent procedures for selecting and employ-
ing an expert can assuage concerns that the expert might dominate the
negotiation process by imposing her own or the judge’s will on the parties.
This concern is particularly salient in the municipal context because experts,
unlike municipal officials, are not democratically elected. The current ad hoc
method of judges appointing experts similarly raises concerns because bank-
ruptcy judges are also not democratically elected. Open procedures that al-
low parties to articulate the reasons for appointing an expert, such as those
proposed above, increase transparency and accountability on the part of
both the judge and the expert.247 Involving parties other than the judge in
the appointment and selection process also decreases the risk that the judge
will be seen as overstepping the boundaries of his or her role in the case.
Formalizing procedures regarding experts in chapter 9 also allows for a
vetting process and protects parties from having to work with someone who
is perceived as being too close to the judge or to powerful parties, such as
creditors. For example, recently the district judge overseeing Puerto Rico’s
bankruptcy rejected a proposal from the oversight board and suggested that
the board and creditors resume negotiations using her selected team of
mediators.248 Although the judge’s decision assuaged some creditors who be-
lieved the oversight board was exercising too much influence,249 nudging the
parties into mediation with the judge’s hand-selected mediators raises con-
cerns about judicial influence and may be no less problematic. In addition to
providing legitimacy, a transparent selection process allows for multiple
stakeholders to play a role in defining the expert’s powers and prevents the
judge from selecting someone based on the judge’s sole perception of who is
qualified. Having multiple parties involved in the expert’s selection and ap-
pointment also minimizes the risk that the expert will simply impose the
judge’s preferences on creditors or other parties.250
Open discussion about the experts that are needed for a particular case
is also valuable because different types of expertise are needed in different
cases. One salient criticism of the oversight board for Puerto Rico is that its
plan did not adequately address the unique causes and consequences of Pu-
erto Rico’s fiscal crisis.251 Although the oversight board is comprised of fi-
nancial experts, this criticism shows that the right mix of financial,
community, and bankruptcy experts may be lacking. Open discussion of
247. See Rasmussen & Skeel, supra note 51, at 12 (describing the need for transparency to
promote political accountability).
248. Steven Church, Puerto Rico Told to Revamp Plan for Sales-Tax Agency Advocate,
Bankr. L. Rep. (BNA), at 1 (July 13, 2017).
249. Id.
250. See Rasmussen & Skeel, supra note 51, at 33 (discussing concerns that a single actor
will not act to maximize the value of an entity or its interest).
251. Merling et al., supra note 5, at 3.
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experts, their qualifications, and the roles they need to play in the case can
help ensure that the type of expertise that is needed in a case can be found.
As previously discussed, experts could optimize the bankruptcy experi-
ence for municipalities by reducing the need for litigation, overcoming the
resource constraints of the bankruptcy judge, providing avenues for partici-
pation by creditors and other parties in interest, and creating incentives for
parties who need it to use the bankruptcy process. One concern with en-
couraging use of bankruptcy is that it increases the risk of moral hazard,
including frivolous filings. The expert’s role in facilitating more rigorous
application of the confirmation standards should, however, make frivolous
filings less likely to occur, as municipalities that do not stand to gain from
bankruptcy would not use the system. Over time, using experts on a regular
basis to clarify application of the plan confirmation standards may also en-
able municipalities to see in advance what they can accomplish by filing for
bankruptcy, and thus allow municipal officials to make a more informed
decision about whether bankruptcy is a productive path forward.
A drawback to using experts is already evident in the current chapter 9
process: if experts take issues off the table at plan confirmation through
encouraging settlement, they necessarily minimize the number of judicial
opinions on key legal issues and contribute to the perpetuation of the lack of
relevant precedent in chapter 9.252 Discomfort with this outcome may be
minimized, however, if the parties can trust that the experts are doing a
good job. Chapter 9 procedures that institute a formal process for these ex-
perts can increase that trust.
A final benefit of establishing formal procedures for use of experts is
that these procedures will separate the expert from the judge and reduce the
appearance of impropriety or undue influence. A side effect to this benefit is
that parties may be less inclined to negotiate if they feel that the judge is not
creating this pressure. After all, the judge holds significant power at the
chapter 9 plan confirmation stage. On balance, however, the bankruptcy
process itself still provides significant incentives to negotiate,253 and concerns
over abuse and manipulation through retention of the status quo likely out-
weigh any minor disincentive to negotiate that may result from imposing
procedures for an expert.
Implementing formal procedures for experts in chapter 9 will require
resources, foresight, and time. In addition, state and local officials will have
to contemplate bankruptcy, a topic that is disfavored among most public
officials. Despite these obstacles, state and local governments will benefit
from putting in the effort now to identify and select experts. As discussed,
these experts could also assist financially distressed municipalities prior to
their entry into chapter 9. If and when a municipality files for bankruptcy,
experts could quickly assume their designated roles and work to expedite the
252. See Berman & Schneider, supra note 96.
253. See Pryor, supra note 29, at 122 (discussing these incentives).
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municipality’s bankruptcy exit. Parties to the case, including citizens, munic-
ipal officials, and creditors, could also feel more confident about working
with experts that they have had a role in choosing.
* * *
In all, a carefully planned selection process, combined with a defined
scope and role for experts to play, will be key to ensuring that the expert is
not beholden to the interests of any one party in a municipal bankruptcy.
Although the procedures described here should be subject to further scru-
tiny and refinement, they are intended to serve as a starting point for further
inquiry into the critical goal of paying more attention to experts, parties
who—despite the substantial powers they can wield in a case—have largely
flown under the radar. As courts continue to struggle with the question of
what rights a debtor has to exit bankruptcy on its own terms, providing a
formal, defined role for experts in the chapter 9 bankruptcy process can help
all parties, including the judge, ascertain what a municipality’s interests are,
and what those terms should look like. Although regular use of chapter 9
experts will require work on the part of Congress and the states, the consis-
tency with which the expert proposal has arisen across the bankruptcy and
insolvency spectrum suggests that there is much to be gained by doing the
work necessary to make experts a more permanent and deliberate part of
chapter 9.
Conclusion
In many cases, both within chapter 9 and the larger insolvency context,
judges have sought guidance in the form of outside expertise to help them
overcome difficulties with assessing whether a proposed debt restructuring is
feasible and fair. To assist judges with applying the chapter 9 confirmation
standards to struggling municipalities, as well as to better protect debtors
and creditors in chapter 9, this Article advocates for the regular, formalized
use of experts in municipal bankruptcy proceedings. To lend legitimacy to
these experts, transparency to the selection process, and clarity to the par-
ties, this Article further proposes that states, in conjunction with Congress,
develop concrete procedures for the selection, appointment, and perform-
ance of the chapter 9 expert.
Although no one procedure can guarantee that a debtor will exit bank-
ruptcy on stronger financial footing than when it entered, experts can do
many things to ensure that the bankruptcy process stays on track. There is
thus good reason to give serious consideration to the formalized use of ex-
pertise in chapter 9 and in bankruptcy more generally.
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